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CONFRONTING ADR AGREEMENTS' CONTRACT/
NO-CONTRACT CONUNDRUM WITH
GOOD FAITH
Amy J. Schmitz*
INTRODUCTION
Should there be legal recourse for bargaining gone bad? Professor
Charles Knapp explored this question in his influential article, Enforc-
ing the Contract to Bargain, and courts have continued to struggle with
it, despite public policy that supports cooperative processes.1 En-
forcement of "contracts to bargain" or to pursue other cooperative
processes creates a conundrum by calling courts to confront intricate
difficulties in filling gaps and fashioning remedies for breach.2 Moreo-
ver, these difficulties are now threatening the efficacy and vitality of
agreements to participate in mediation and other nonbinding alterna-
tive dispute resolution processes, which I refer to as "ADR agree-
ments" to distinguish them from contracts requiring binding
arbitration. 3
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I thank Charles Knapp and my
fellow participants, Kristin M. Madison, Alan Schwartz, and Omri Ben-Shahar, on the Revisiting
a Classic: Charles Knapp's Enforcing the Contract to Bargain panel at the American Association
of Law Schools Contracts Conference "Exploring the Boundaries of Contract Law," in Mon-
treal, Canada (June 17, 2005). I also thank Nestor Davidson and Mark Lowenstein for their
comments, and David Blower and Kathryn Bostwick for their research assistance, as well as
Melissa Pingsley, Matthew Perry, and Andra Zeppelin for their assistance with final citation
verification.
1. See generally Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673,
680-86 (1969).
2. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 497 (1986) (defining "conundrum" as "a
puzzle or problem that is ... intricate and difficult of solution").
3. "ADR," or Alternative Dispute Resolution, generally refers to any nonlitigation dispute
resolution process, which some define to include binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA) and Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA). See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding
Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument that the Term "ADR" Has Begun to Outlive Its
Usefulness, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 97 (discussing terminology confusion). I use the term "ADR
agreements" here, however, to concisely refer to contracts requiring parties to submit disputes to
nonbinding alternative dispute resolution processes outside the scope of the FAA and UAA,
such as negotiation and mediation. See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitra-
tion's Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 124-32 (2002) (distinguishing
final arbitration under the FAA from nonbinding processes).
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Professor Knapp's conception of a "contract to bargain" is a useful
framework for exploring the enforcement of ADR agreements be-
cause it captures "middle position" situations. In these situations, par-
ties stand at the crossroads between "yes-contract" and "no-contract"
by incorporating flexibility and leaving gaps in the terms of their
deals. As Professor Knapp has explained, they signify their "willing-
ness to be regarded as 'committed' to the entire proposed exchange"
by negotiating and reaching agreement on some terms of the deal, but
nonetheless delaying agreement on other important terms.4 Similarly,
parties to ADR agreements commit to an underlying exchange but
promise to pursue a cooperative process to resolve any disputes that
arise during performance. In both cases, parties expect to cooperate
but usually do not specify what that cooperation entails.
Although public policy ostensibly supports ADR, courts have failed
to adequately analyze and enforce ADR agreements. Instead of con-
sidering the middle-position nature of these agreements, courts jump
to the same formalist yes-contract/no-contract conclusions they have
imposed on other contracts to bargain. They either assume ADR
agreements fall in the no-contract column under traditional, formalist
conceptions of so-called "agreements-to-agree," or they mistreat non-
binding dispute resolution processes as binding arbitration under the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 5 or the Uniform Arbitration Act
(UAA).6 Even if the results are acceptable in some cases, problems
arise when courts misapply statutes and formalist doctrines to over- or
under-enforce ADR agreements. 7 Courts may cut off the parties'
contractually preserved access to judicial recourse by using the FAA
to jump to the yes-contract conclusion that a binding contract exists.
Moreover, the failure of courts and legislators to openly confront the
yes-contract/no-contract conundrum of ADR agreements has left par-
ties without adequate contracting guidance.
In a previous article, I critiqued the improper treatment of nonbind-
ing ADR as binding arbitration under the FAA and UAA and invited
courts to refresh common-law contractual analysis of ADR agree-
4. Knapp, supra note 1, at 685.
5. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). The FAA governs only written agreements to submit disputes to
final and binding arbitration. See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 366-69 (3d Cir. 2003) (hold-
ing nonbinding private resolution procedure is not arbitration governed by the FAA).
6. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-33, 7 U.L.A. 1, 9-94 (2000) (parroting the FAA and repre-
senting state law in nearly every jurisdiction).
7. See, e.g., Inland Group of Cos., Inc. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 985 P.2d 674, 678-80 &
n.1 (Idaho 1999) (assuming in a footnote that the state's UAA applied to an insurance policy's
appraisal provision, and using the Act's pro-arbitration law and procedures).
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ments.8 I suggested that courts should enforce ADR agreements flex-
ibly where parties' participation in an ADR process will foster fair
settlement or provide other collateral benefits that outweigh the bur-
dens of compelled participation in the process.9 For example, it may
be appropriate for a court to use the common law to order corporate
buyers and sellers to negotiate price adjustments under an ADR
agreement in an installment sales contract. In contrast, a court might
refuse to order an employee to mediate sexual harassment claims
against an intimidating or abusive employer.
This Article goes a step further by confronting the tensions and
complications courts face when they actually apply such common-law
analysis to enforce ADR agreements. The Article shows how Profes-
sor Knapp's conception of a contract to bargain captures the middle-
position nature of ADR agreements and explains why they are ill-
suited for formalist "one-size-fits-all" enforcement.' 0 This is because
formalist rules ignore the human context of ADR agreements." They
undervalue "relational realities" and often fail to adequately redress
the parties' harms.1 2 Furthermore, rigid enforcement rules create ar-
bitrary and unfair outcomes; these outcomes ultimately cause the
rules to become inefficient and less legitimate. A court applying rigid
rules, for example, would treat the above-referenced installment sales
and harassment claimants the same-regardless of how the parties'
relations evolved after they agreed to their original contracts. Al-
though this seems to foster contract law's efficiency goals, such quick
yes-contract conclusions may cause parties to suffer emotional harm
8. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Refreshing Contractual Analysis of ADR Agreements by Cur-
ing Bipolar Avoidance of Modern Common Law, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2004).
9. Id. at 62-74.
10. See Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS
L.J. 1191, 1201-03 (1998) (describing the "postmodern," post-Reagan period as "nudg[ing] con-
tract back toward a kind of formalism that had seemed obsolescent only a decade or so ago");
see also Harvey L. Temkin, When Does the "Fat Lady" Sing?: An Analysis of "Agreements in
Principle" in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 FORDIIAM L. REV. 125, 127 n.12 (1986) (observing how
an "all-or-nothing" approach may be attractive because it "allows a man to know where he
stands" but that such a rule may be overly harsh).
11. 1 refer to "human" contexts to highlight contextualized relational and seemingly irrational
factors that impact contracting in real life. This builds on modern contextual analysis. See, e.g.,
Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estop-
pel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 78-79 (1981) (highlighting contextualized contract analysis).
12. I use "relational realities" to refer to a broad range of human factors that impact con-
tracting, including not only course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, but also
emotional, reputational, and practical factors of a given relationship. This borrows from Profes-
sor Ian Macneil's "relational contracts," and his observation that classical doctrine embraces a
confined "presentiation" by viewing exchange as bound by present events, namely offer and
acceptance at the time of contract. See Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and
Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589, 589-93 (1974) (critiquing "presentiation" in classical law).
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or reach one-sided settlements, while narrow no-contract conclusions
render ADR agreements meaningless.
This Article invites courts to go beyond formalist yes-contract/no-
contract conclusions to craft appropriate remedies for enforcing ADR
agreements. The Article proposes that courts should separately de-
cide (1) whether there is a valid ADR agreement, and (2) how to
overcome obstacles to determine breach and craft remedies for re-
dressing breach. Although this seems to be what courts already do
when they decide contract cases, the reality is that courts collapse
these questions into one yes-contract/no-contract conclusion to escape
the difficulties of defining ADR duties and determining proper reme-
dies. The proposed approach allows for more relational and contex-
tual analysis by asking courts to ease formalist rules that have
traditionally limited enforcement of contracts requiring cooperation.
The Article also seeks to spark consideration of remedial tools that
courts have not adequatbly utilized in enforcing these agreements in
the past.
Part II discusses the yes-contract/no-contract conundrum of con-
tracts to bargain, and how this conundrum has impacted the analysis
of ADR agreements. 13 Part III highlights some of the problems with
this yes-contract/no-contract conundrum. 14 Part IV discusses the first
step of my proposed analysis of ADR agreements, and explains my
suggested approach for determining validity of ADR agreements and
defining parties' duties to comply with these agreements in good
faith.15 Finally, Part V focuses on the second step of the proposed
analysis and addresses how courts may overcome evidentiary hurdles
of determining breach and suggests some tools that courts may em-
ploy to remedy breach. 16 The Article concludes by inviting considera-
tion of this proposed analysis as a starting point for further
exploration into the means for addressing the yes-contract/no-contract
conundrum that is threatening the efficacy of ADR agreements and
other contracts to bargain.
II. ADR AGREEMENTS' CHARACTERIZATION AS
CONTRACTS TO BARGAIN
Professor Knapp crafted the action-oriented term "contracts to bar-
gain" in order to stress the bargaining process that agreements with
13. See infra notes 17-83 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 84-156 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 157-222 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 223-290 and accompanying text.
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open terms often require. 17 ADR agreements also require such bar-
gaining, which causes courts to struggle with their enforcement. Com-
mentators frown on the "best efforts" standards these agreements
often demand because they assume such vague standards foster ineffi-
ciency.' 8 Moreover, courts are reluctant to order parties to conform
their bargaining behavior to moral or ethical norms of conduct. 19 In-
stead, courts have avoided these enforcement issues by collapsing va-
lidity and remedy issues into an all-or-nothing yes-contract/no-
contract analysis of these contracts to bargain or to engage in ADR.
A. The Yes-Contract/No-Contract Conundrum of
Contracts to Bargain
Formalist contract law rigidly enforces only those bargained-for ex-
changes that are marked by offer, acceptance, and consideration. This
rigid regime prefers clear terms that a court can enforce without hav-
ing to fill gaps or monitor ongoing conduct. Formalist contract law
thus concludes that "the so-called contract to make a contract is not a
contract at all" because it leaves terms open to parties' later negotia-
tion. 20 This approach assumes a bright line exists between yes-con-
tract and no-contract: either the parties have concluded a final
contract or they have no contract because they contemplate further
negotiations. 21 If the parties expect to negotiate open terms, they re-
main free to walk away at any time and for any reason.22
The types of contracts caught in this yes-contract/no-contract co-
nundrum have traditionally been categorized as "agreements to
agree" or "formal contracts contemplated. '23 Courts have been reluc-
tant to enforce agreements to agree because they leave terms open,
although the parties have agreed to most terms and manifest a com-
17. Knapp, supra note 1, at 685 n.41 (explaining use of verb form "to bargain" in lieu of noun
form such as "bargain contract").
18. Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. 814, 817-18, 831-32 (2006) (discussing contract scholars' assertions that parties avoid
vague "best efforts" or "commercial reasonableness" standards due to concerns regarding uncer-
tainty costs).
19. Knapp, supra note 1, at 678-79 (noting also how common contract law does not necessa-
rily conform to parties' "private moral code").
20. Id. at 674 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29 (rev. ed. 1963)).
21. Id. at 673-86 (explaining the theoretical divide between yes-contract/no-contract under
common law).
22. Id. at 675-76 (adding how legal realism softens this rigidity by considering moral or ethical
duties to continue negotiations, but concluding that courts still apply the yes-contract/no-con-
tract regime).
23. Id. at 676.
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mitment to reach agreement on the open terms.2 4 Similarly, courts
may refuse to enforce formal contracts contemplated despite the par-
ties' agreement on the terms of a deal because they contemplate that
the parties will conclude a formal, written contract. Even the some-
what liberalized enforcement of agreements to agree under the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC) assumes the dichotomous yes-
contract/no-contract regime that "does not exhaust the catalog of pos-
sible intentions." 25
Professor Knapp introduced contracts to bargain as middle-position
cases in this catalog because they involve contracts in which the par-
ties have reached agreement to such a degree that they are committed
to a proposed exchange.26 The parties, therefore, expect that the
other may not walk away from the contemplated exchange unless they
cannot reach final agreement after "good faith bargaining. ' 27 Knapp
proposed that promissory estoppel and the UCC should provide the
bases for courts to enforce these contracts to bargain in order to effec-
tuate the parties' expectations and promote other important bargain-
ing policies.28
Promissory estoppel may justify compensation for detrimental reli-
ance induced by a party's manifest commitment to an unconcluded
bargain.29 In some contract to bargain cases, this may allow a party to
recover losses suffered in reliance on promises to follow through with
a deal. This equitable remedy, however, does not cover all contracts
to bargain because it hinges on whether the plaintiff can prove it suf-
fered sufficient damage due to reasonable reliance on the defendant's
firm offer to bargain.30 This is particularly difficult where it appears
that the parties did not expect to be bound to the contemplated bar-
gain until after they had agreed on open terms.31 Furthermore, some
courts have declined to find the requisite reasonable reliance because
24. Id. at 676-77.
25. Knapp, supra note 1, at 678.
26. Id. at 685-86.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 686.
29. Id. at 686-88 (explaining the application of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90
(1965)).
30. See Barnes & Robinson Co. v. OneSource Facility Servs., Inc., No. M2004-01003-COA-
R3-CV, 2006 WL 163218, at *3-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2006) (refusing to find a duty to
negotiate in good faith absent an express duty and narrowly applying promissory estoppel to
require clear economic loss due to reasonable detrimental reliance).
31. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 688-89 (emphasizing how contracts to bargain do not fit the
promissory estoppel paradigm because the parties to these contracts have not set all contract
terms, and are not necessarily duped into relying on the other's definite and clear promissory
offer).
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they deem it unreasonable to detrimentally rely on a promise to
negotiate. 32
Professor Knapp therefore proposed that UCC § 2-204(3) should
provide another possible basis for enforcing contracts to bargain. 33
Section 2-204(3) allows for enforcement of agreements "[e]ven though
one or more terms are left open" where the parties' intent to conclude
a contract is clear and there is "a reasonably certain basis for giving an
appropriate remedy. '34 Knapp suggested that this provision allows
for some "lack of definiteness. '35 He urged that courts could use this
provision to enforce contracts to bargain depending on (1) whether
the parties "intend[ed] to make a contract," and (2) whether there is
"a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy. '36
Knapp explained that by considering context and business practices in
a given case, courts could provide a remedy to effectuate the parties'
intent, promote reasonable commercial behavior, and foster the
UCC's continued relevancy.37
This analysis left open the question of what constitutes sufficient
intent to bargain, and what "bad faith" behavior qualifies as a breach
of the duty to bargain.38 In addition, UCC § 2-305, which regulates
contracts with open price terms, generally deems failure to agree on
price as a deal-breaker where the parties have not indicated a clear
intent to be bound if a price is not set.39 Many commentators and
courts have construed this provision to qualify UCC § 2-403's allow-
ance for indefiniteness and to condone a "seemingly universal" rejec-
tion of agreements to agree.40 Contracts to bargain have therefore
fallen into a yes-contract/no-contract conundrum because courts ei-
32. Barnes, 2006 WL 163218, at *5-7 (refusing to apply promissory estoppel liberally in find-
ing no duty to negotiate in good faith).
33. Knapp, supra note 1, at 692.
34. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2002).
35. Knapp, supra note 1, at 692.
36. Id. at 692-93.
37. Id. at 694-95.
38. Id. at 698-99, 720-22 (acknowledging these murky issues and explaining how courts may
approach resolving them).
39. U.C.C. § 2-305.
40. Knapp, supra note 1, at 693-97, 726-27 (acknowledging that "reasonable price" enforce-
ment under UCC § 2-305 may be improper in contract to bargain cases where there has been
"[a] genuine breakdown in negotiations," but proposing that UCC § 2-305 should not preclude
enforcement of a contract to bargain unless the parties have not reached agreement on price
after "bargaining in good faith").
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ther refuse to enforce them as empty agreements to agree or imply
"reasonable" terms in order to enforce final deals. 41
Courts have found it difficult to fashion middle-position remedies
that enforce contracts to bargain. Because contracts to bargain
merely require that parties seek to conclude a deal, it is usually im-
proper for a court to award expectation damages. 42 Furthermore, par-
ties are usually unable to prove damages with reasonable certainty in
contract to bargain cases where the parties have left terms open.43 In
addition, courts generally refuse to order parties to negotiate due to
"the inevitable lapse of time and the likely estrangement of the
parties. " 44
Nonetheless, contract law should more readily enforce these con-
tracts to bargain in order to "tip the scales against bad faith" and pro-
mote parties' compliance with their commitments.45 As Professor
Knapp argued, such enforcement would at least shed light on reality.46
He concluded that "the 'contract to make a contract' has been as
firmly fixed in the affairs of men as the moon in its track, and yet,
because of a seemingly unavoidable logical contradiction, has been as
remote from our legal system as the moon seemed to Professor
Corbin['s classical law]."47
B. Bipolar Enforcement of ADR Agreements
ADR Agreements are contracts to bargain because they call upon
parties to bargain with the hope of producing a final settlement agree-
ment, although they do not require the parties to actually reach an
agreement. 48 During ADR processes, a third party may facilitate set-
tlement between the parties or provide an evaluation of their respec-
tive cases, which the parties remain free to accept or reject.4 9 This
41. Nonetheless, there are some courts that may take a "middle position" by ordering dam-
ages due to reliance on the contemplated deal See id. at 723-24 (highlighting difficulty of deter-
mining breach and remedies-for breach of "good faith" duties to bargain).
42. See id. (highlighting this "harder" question of appropriate remedy, and proposing factors
bearing on its analysis).
43. See id.
44. Id. at 725.
45. Id. at 726-27.
46. Knapp, supra note 1, at 726-27.
47. Id. at 728.
48. Again, I use "ADR Agreements" to refer to nonbinding dispute resolution to distinguish
these agreements from binding arbitration agreements under the FAA and UAA, which require
parties to abide by a third party determination.
49. See, e.g., Better Business Bureau (BBB), BBB Auto Line, http://www.dr.bbb.org/autoline
(last visited Aug. 29, 2006) (providing information regarding the BBB's program for resolving
consumers' Lemon Law warranty disputes against car manufacturers through conditionally bind-
ing arbitration, which produces awards consumers may accept or reject, and detailing the proce-
[Vol. 56:55
2006] GIVING MEANING TO GOOD FAITH IN ADR 63
indeterminacy creates tough enforcement and remedy difficulties. For
example, how should a court enforce an employee's contractual duty
to mediate sexual harassment claims?50 Many courts have avoided
these questions by either denying enforcement of such ADR agree-
ments or treating nonbinding processes like arbitration in order to
force parties to settle or accept a third party's decision on their
claims.51 Courts also have dodged the enforcement and remedy diffi-
culties of ADR agreements by assuming they are unenforceable under
formalist common-law principles that bar enforcement of "agreements
to agree." 52 Courts' yes-contract/no-contract assumptions have there-
fore bred confusing and "splintered" contract law that threatens the
utility and efficiency of ADR.
53
1. Mistreatment of ADR Agreements as Arbitration
Binding arbitration is not the same as a nonbinding ADR process.
Arbitration agreements under the FAA and UAA are governed by a
rigid pro-enforcement scheme that is not suited for ADR agree-
ments.54 ADR agreements are beyond the scope of the FAA and
dures and rules for that arbitration program); see also Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d
343, 349 (3d Cir. 1997) (refusing to apply the FAA to the BBB's Auto Line conditionally binding
arbitration procedure).
50. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 8, at 1-2.
51. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 831,
861 (citing examples of courts using arbitration statutes to enforce nonbinding dispute resolution
processes).
52. See id. at 831-35 (warning against application of arbitration laws to dispute resolution
"willy-nilly without discussion").
53. Charles L. Knapp, An Offer You Can't Revoke, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 309, 316-17 (highlight-
ing how even after the flood of law-and-economics analysis crested, modern contract law failed
"to pull itself together").
54. See Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140, 1142-45 (5th
Cir. 1985) (emphasizing that courts must broadly construe arbitration agreements and compel
arbitration, unless an opponent rebuts the enforcement presumption with strong evidence that
the dispute is not covered by an agreement); Ohio Council 8, Am. Fed'n of State, County &
Mun. Employees v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 459
N.E.2d 220, 222-23 (Ohio 1984) (per curiam) (refusing to apply arbitration law to a nonbinding
dispute resolution procedure, and emphasizing that arbitration and mediation "are not function-
ally equivalent"); Gregory Firestone, An Analysis of Principled Advocacy in the Development of
the Uniform Mediation Act, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 265, 277 (2002) ("Mediation can be distin-
guished from binding arbitration in that the parties are the decision-makers and the mediator
has no decision-making authority."); Lisa C. Thompson, International Dispute Resolution in the
United States and Mexico: A Practical Guide to Terms, Arbitration Clauses, and the Enforcement
of Judgments and Arbitral Awards, 24 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1, 31 (1997) (contrasting
extraordinary enforcement scheme applicable to arbitration and contract-law remedies applica-
ble to other nonarbitration procedures); see also City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S.
180, 192-99 (1910) (finding that appraisal was not arbitration, and therefore "the strict rules
relating to arbitration and awards do not apply"); Collins v. Collins, 53 Eng. Rep. 916, 919 (1858)
(finding that Act of Parliament governing enforcement of arbitration did not apply to appraisal,
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UAA because they do not require the parties to abide by a third
party's resolution of their dispute. 55 Nonetheless, some courts have
effectively rewritten ADR agreements and forced parties to reach fi-
nal settlements by glossing over language that requires nonbinding
ADR and mandating that the parties arbitrate under the FAA or
UAA.
The approach ignores parties' chosen contract terms and subjects
ADR agreements to a statutory scheme ill-suited for agreements that
do not require parties to waive trial rights and abide by a third party's
determination of their dispute. The FAA and UAA mandate that
courts automatically order specific performance of valid agreements
to arbitrate, without balancing equities and exercising discretion as a
court would otherwise do before ordering coercive remedies under
common law. 56 In addition, the FAA/UAA scheme prescribes strict
enforcement procedures that include streamlined motion practice, lib-
eral venue provisions, immediate appeal from orders adverse to arbi-
tration, arbitral immunity, limited review of awards, and treatment of
awards as judgments.57 Therefore, although courts may look to the
Acts for guidance in enforcing ADR agreements, they should be care-
ful not to misapply these Acts in ways that contradict legislative prin-
ciples and contract-law equities. 58
For example, in AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,59 the court decided
the FAA required the parties to submit their advertising dispute to a
nonbinding advisory tribunal-essentially equating evaluative media-
tion with binding arbitration governed by the FAA. 6° The court
and therefore remedies for breach of an appraisal agreement under common law would apply);
Wesley A. Sturges & Richard E. Reckson, Common-Law and Statutory Arbitration: Problems
Arising from Their Coexistence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 819, 820 (1962) (emphasizing that the sections
of the FAA "are integrally related and are not a series of independent provisions").
55. This was the focus of a prior article, and therefore I will not belabor the point here. See
Schmitz, supra note 8, at 1-7 (emphasizing inapplicability of FAA or UAA to nonbinding ADR
agreements); see also Lynn v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 03-2662-GTV-DJW, 2005 WL 701270, at *7-8
(D. Kan. Jan. 20, 2005) (finding FAA and UAA did not apply to agreement to mediate).
56. See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 931-32 (10th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing
FAA's special statutory scheme). Under contract law, courts will exercise discretion to specifi-
cally enforce a contract only when ordering damages would be inadequate, and coercive relief is
appropriate in light of all facts and circumstances, as well as the public interest. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. c (1981); see also U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (2002) (providing that
courts may order specific performance of a sale of goods "where the goods are unique or in
other proper circumstances").
57. See infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the FAA's broad remedial scheme).
58. See infra notes 223-238 and accompanying text (proposing flexible and process-oriented
application of common-law remedies to enforcement of ADR agreements).
59. 621 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
60. Id. at 459-60 (defining arbitration loosely to include any submission of a dispute to a third
party); see also United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 322 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing AMF,
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hinged its decision on the FAA, only intimating that the agreement
was likely enforceable under New York contract law.61 In addition,
the court's use of the FAA suggested that the court would treat the
arbitrator's decision as final and subject it to very limited review
under the Act.62 Courts have also assumed that the FAA and UAA
apply to arbitration procedures that are nonbinding because they are
subject to trial de novo. 63 In many cases, courts ignore the parties'
contracts and require the parties to accept the arbitrators' determina-
tions as final and subject to only limited judicial review under the stat-
ute.64 This thwarts contractual intent and neglects contract law, which
requires courts to weigh equities before ordering specific performance
of contract duties.
Meanwhile, other courts treat nonbinding processes as arbitration
in order to deny enforcement based on antiquated ouster and revoca-
621 F. Supp. at 461) (finding nonbinding dispute resolution agreements enforceable under the
FAA); Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 1998) (same).
61. AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 459 (citing George W. Taylor, Preface to EDWIN E. WITTE, HISTORI-
CAL SURVEY OF LABOR ARBITRATION vi (1952)). Application of the FAA presumably pre-
empted antiquated state law precluding enforcement of arbitration or ADR agreements. See
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984) (holding FAA preempts state law inhibiting
arbitration).
62. AMF, 621 F. Supp. at 461-62.
63. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 1242, 1244-51 (Ohio 1992) (assuming
that the only form of arbitration is binding arbitration subject to the FAA/UAA remedial
scheme); see also Jennifer L. Shaw, Note, The Tie That Binds: Arbitration in Ohio After Schaefer
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 779, 779-81, 795-97 (1993) (discussing the Schaefer
court's failure to consider the utility and enforceability of trial de novo procedures).
64. Field v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 769 F. Supp. 1135, 1140-42 (D. Haw. 1991) (treating trial de
novo like binding arbitration, and thus striking the provision and requiring limited judicial re-
view under Hawaii's arbitration statute); Saika v. Gold, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 923-27 (Ct. App.
1996) (voiding trial de novo provision in physician's contract with his patient); Goulart v. Crum
& Forster Pets. Ins. Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 627, 627-28 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding insurance code
arbitration provision prevented either party from seeking trial de novo); Huizar v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 952 P.2d 342, 346-49 (Colo. 1998) (en banc) (holding that insurance agreement allowing
either party to request trial de novo if the award exceeded $25,000 was against public policy)
Zook v. Allstate Ins. Co., 503 A.2d 24, 25-27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (finding trial de novo provi-
sion ambiguous and thus unenforceable, especially because "a court of competent jurisdiction is
only empowered to disturb the arbitration award if there is evidence of fraud, misconduct, cor-
ruption or some other irregularity which caused the rendition of an unjust, inequitable or uncon-
scionable award"): Slaiman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 A.2d 873, 873 (R.I. 1992) (holding trial de
novo provision violates public policy); Godfrey v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 16 P.3d 617, 621-23
(Wash. 2001) (en banc) (holding trial de novo provision unenforceable because parties "cannot
submit a dispute to arbitration only to see if it goes well for their position before invoking the
courts' jurisdiction"; further explaining that it would ignore the trial de novo provision because
arbitration law "does not contemplate nonbinding arbitration" and courts will not "condone
what amounts to a waste of judicial resources"); Petersen v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 955 P.2d
852, 854-56 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (voiding trial de novo provision because "[t]he purpose of
arbitration is to avoid the courts to resolve a dispute").
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bility doctrines.65 These doctrines preclude enforcement of arbitra-
tion contracts based on courts' traditional "jealousy" of arbitration. 66
The revocability doctrine stated that arbitration agreements were
freely revocable by any disputant, while the ouster doctrine declared
that courts would not enforce arbitration that sought to "oust the
courts of jurisdiction" or displace judicial power to resolve disputes.67
Although it seems pro-ADR policy would eclipse these doctrines,
some courts have continued to honor or otherwise incorporate ouster
and revocability principles into their narrow perception that they lack
power to order participation in contractual ADR processes not gov-
erned by statute.68
2. Misperception that ADR Agreements Are Empty
"Agreements-to-Agree"
While some courts have bound parties to ADR agreements to final
settlements based on misapplication of arbitration law, others have
neutralized these agreements under rigid formalist rules preventing
65. See Schmitz, supra note 8, at 27-42 (discussing evolution and application of traditional
judicial doctrines precluding the specific enforcement of agreements requiring participation in
private dispute resolution processes).
66. See CLARENCE F. BIRDSEYE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENERAL BUSINESS AND LEGAL FORMS
205 (1924) (emphasizing common-law courts' jealousy and opposition to arbitration, despite
their enforcement of other contracts); Charles Newton Hulvey, Arbitration of Commercial Dis-
putes, 15 VA. L. REV. 238, 238-39 (1929) (stating reasons courts did not enforce arbitration
agreements).
67. See Hulvey, supra note 66, at 239-41 (discussing doctrine refusing to compel performance
of an agreement "intended to oust the courts of their jurisdiction").
68. See HIM Portland, L.L.C. v. Devito Builders, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 230, 233 n.5 (D. Me.
2002) (finding parties' failure to trigger an arbitration requirement by seeking mediation under
the contract precluded application of the FAA, and thus allowing the parties to litigate "because
the Court cannot order the parties to mediate"); see also Lucy V. Katz, Enforcing an ADR
Clause-Are Good Intentions All You Have?, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 575, 583-87 (1988) (critiquing
courts' refusal to specifically enforce nonbinding dispute resolution agreements based on com-
mon-law principles that "equity will not enforce a 'vain order,' or require litigants to do some-
thing that would be ineffectual or futile," and breach of such agreements causes no harm
because when "one party is determined not to settle, the other party is not harmed by the refusal
to engage in ADR"); Tim K. Klintworth, The Enforceability of an Agreement to Submit to a Non-
Arbitral Form of Dispute Resolution: The Rise of Mediation and Neutral Fact-Finding, 1995 J.
Disp. RESOL. 181, 188, 194 (explaining that one reason modern courts have been reluctant to
enforce nonarbitral dispute resolution agreements without statutory backing is because they
view these agreements as "tak[ing] away some of the courts [sic] power," and further emphasiz-
ing that "many courts have worried that alternative dispute resolution processes are robbing
them of their power and jurisdiction to deal with cases that they would normally have a right to
govern"); cf. Philip G. Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Applied to a
Voluntary Proceeding, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1258, 1259-61 (1933) (emphasizing that courts' blanket
refusal to specifically enforce executory arbitration agreements was based on flawed judicial
doctrine reflecting courts' hostility to private dispute resolution, but that courts continued to
blindly apply the doctrine even when they admitted its complete "lack of logic").
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enforcement of "agreements to agree." Despite the merger of law
and equity, courts have continued to assume that they lack the power
to specifically enforce agreements to engage in private dispute resolu-
tion.69 They presume that ADR procedures are too uncertain or futile
to be worthy of judicial compulsion. 70
One would expect that this anti-enforcement attitude disappeared
with the rise of ADR's popularity.71 In reality, however, trends pro-
moting contract formalism and autonomy have pushed courts to be-
come increasingly reluctant to enforce what they deem ambiguous
agreements to agree. 72 Emphasizing the presumed efficiency of clear
enforcement rules, they focus merely on whether a contract has suffi-
ciently "definite" standards.73 They also undervalue the process and
relational values of ADR by assuming ADR agreements are unen-
forceable simply because a court cannot force the parties to settle
their disputes.7 4 In this way, courts generally take a dichotomous ap-
69. Alfred Hayes, Specific Performance of Contracts for Arbitration or Valuation, 1 CORNELL
L.Q. 225. 225 (1916).
70. See Pillow v. Pillow's Heirs, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 644, 646 (1842) (holding that an agreement
requiring land be appraised by three named persons could not be specifically enforced because
the court had no power to "make a new contract" by selecting substitute appraisers and refused
to compel the commissioners named in the contract to appraise the property); Dave Greytak
Enters., Inc. v. Mazda Motors of Am., Inc., 622 A.2d 14, 22-24 (Del. Ch. 1992) (finding parties
had no duty to negotiate in good faith pursuant to their contract because any such obligation
would provide only "the first step of a more comprehensive procedural scheme" eventually lead-
ing to binding dispute resolution, and assuming without adequate explanation that ordering ne-
gotiation would necessarily stir litigation and "possible contempt decree").
71. See ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., ARBITRATION 59 (2d ed. 2002) (noting the "pro-arbitration"
policies in many states). Some states have also created offices to encourage mediation. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-101 to -104 (West 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 613-1 to -4 (West
1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-501 to -516 (West 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27E-73 (West 1994).
72. See RAU ET AL., supra note 71, at 1860 (noting courts' increased regulation of freedom
from contract).
73. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contractual
Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1829, 1860-62 (2004) (discussing courts' reluctance to enforce
agreements to negotiate).
74. See, e.g., Jillcy Film Enters., Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 515, 520-21
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding an agreement to negotiate is not enforceable because it is even more
vague than an agreement to agree); Griffin v. Griffin, 699 P.2d 407, 409-10 (Colo. 1985) (en
banc) (premising analysis of an agreement requiring parents to negotiate and jointly select theit
child's school on the assumption "the parties merely 'agreed to agree,"' and "such agreements
are unenforceable because the court has no power to force the parties to reach agreement and
cannot grant a remedy"); Dave Greytak, 622 A.2d at 22-24 (finding contract did not provide for
specific performance of a duty to negotiate, and emphasizing that the court will not order such
relief because it lacks power to force parties to reach an agreement); Coldmatic Refrigeration of
Can., Ltd. v. Hess, 572 S.E.2d 6. 7-9 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (finding no breach or fraud claims
could be predicated on agreement to sell stock because it left important terms to be negotiated
in the future, and thus "was nothing more than agreement to agree"); see also 1 SAMUEL WILLIS-
TON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 45 (3d ed. 1957)
(stating generally agreements to negotiate are not enforceable).
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proach to such agreements by either filling gaps to enforce a final
agreement or finding that there is no contract at all.75
In addition, courts are reluctant to enforce ADR agreements that
call for good-faith negotiations without setting clear parameters for
what good faith means. In Jillcy Film Enterprises, Inc. v. Home Box
Office, Inc.,76 the court refused to enforce an agreement to negotiate
because it did not state sufficiently specific and objective guidelines
for the process. 77 The contract required that Jillcy and HBO "negoti-
ate exclusively in good faith" regarding HBO's "distribution, exhibi-
tion or other exploitation" of a documentary of the filming of The
Terry Fox Story.78 The court dismissed Jillcy's claim that HBO
breached the contract because such good-faith standards were too un-
certain to enforce. 79
The specificity of participation standards under an ADR agreement
is important in determining the proper remedies for enforcing that
agreement, but a lack of specificity should not necessarily preclude a
court from finding a valid contract.80 Furthermore, the difficulty of
defining good-faith negotiations should not bar enforcement of par-
ties' clear intent.8' The Jillcy court may have been too quick to dis-
miss the claim without first considering whether the parties made an
enforceable commitment to bargain.
This yes-contract/no-contract approach ignores the wide spectrum
of deals parties actually create, and it rewards a party's refusal to
honor an agreement that incorporates flexibility. 82 I proposed in a
75. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 73, at 1862-64 (explaining definiteness requirement).
76. 593 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
77. See id. at 520-21 (quoting and discussing Pinnacle Books, Inc. v. Harlequin Enters., Ltd.,
519 F. Supp. 118, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) and Mocca Lounge, Inc. v. Misak, 462 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706
(App. Div. 1983)).
78. Id. at 516-21 & n.1. The parties executed the negotiation agreement on July 21, 1982, and
had ongoing discussions regarding production and licensing for the documentary until January
19, 1983, when an HBO employee called and told Jillcy's attorney that there would be no deal.
Id. at 517-18. Jillcy claimed, however, that the parties had reached an oral agreement on Janu-
ary 7, that was embodied in the Production and License Agreement HBO sent to another coun-
sel for Jillcy on January 18. Id.
79. Id. at 520-21 (questioning and seemingly denouncing its earlier decision in Thompson v.
Liquichimica of Am., Inc., 481 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)); see also Griffin, 699 P.2d at 409-10
(assuming an agreement requiring parents to negotiate to choose their child's school was an
unenforceable "agree[ment] to agree").
80. See Schmitz, supra note 8, at 60-62 (discussing factors courts should consider in determin-
ing proper enforcement of ADR agreements).
81. Ben-Shahar, supra note 73, at 1860-61 (noting this ambiguity but suggesting a no-retrac-
tion approach for resolving it).
82. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 673-84 (discussing common law's rigid all-or-nothing ap-
proach). See generally RANDY E. BARNETr, PERSPECrIVES ON CoNTRACT LAW (3d ed. 2005)
(describing the traditional refusal to enforce preliminary agreements as "all-or-nothing").
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previous article that courts abandon their presumptive refusal to en-
force "agreements to agree. ' 83 I now explore how courts should use
their enforcement tools to enforce ADR agreements in ways that pro-
mote compliance with commitments to pursue ADR without jeopard-
izing efficiency or party autonomy.
III. PROBLEMS OF BIPOLAR ENFORCEMENT OF
ADR AGREEMENTS
Contract law should not cast ADR agreements into the bipolar, yes-
contract/no-contract abyss. This approach harms the utility of ADR,
muddies contract law, and belittles parties' desires to tailor ADR pro-
visions to their transactions. 84 Furthermore, it results in the over- and
under-enforcement of ADR agreements, and harms the efficiency of
ADR. ADR agreements deserve a more nuanced contract analysis
that acknowledges the messiness of real-world contracting and does
not force these agreements into the classical yes-contract/no-contract
"tennis game model."'85
A. Over- or Under-Enforcement of ADR Agreements
Courts' bipolar treatment of ADR agreements sometimes leads to
over- or under-enforcement of these contracts. Courts that apply the
FAA and UAA to summarily enforce ADR agreements may over-
enforce these contracts by ordering parties to participate in ADR de-
spite facts and equities suggesting such specific enforcement would be
improper under common law. Courts that cling to old common-law
doctrines, however, may under-enforce these agreements by voiding
them without proper analysis. In both cases, courts fail to tackle com-
mon-law contract and remedy analyses and do not provide clear and
coherent enforcement standards. 86 Moreover, they neglect to effectu-
ate the parties' intent. As with other contracts to bargain, ADR
agreements are not promises to conclude settlement contracts, nor are
83. Schmitz, supra note 8, at 3-5.
84. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Substituting Mediation for Arbitration: The Growing Market
for Evaluative Mediation, and What It Means for the ADR Field, 3 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 111,
118-31 (2002) (emphasizing expansion of mediation due, in part, to growing criticism regarding
fairness and judicialization of binding arbitration under the FAA, and challenging mediation
proponents to protect mediation as "a product that succeeds, or fails, on its own").
85. See Knapp, supra note 53, at 321 (describing the classical approach's narrow focus on
offer-and-acceptance as a tennis game: "[T]he offeror serves one over the net; the offeree re-
turns it; if that stroke was a counteroffer, then the offeror hits it back again, and this continues
until the 'game' is over").
86. See Stipanowich, supra note 52, at 868-69 (noting courts' "mixed reactions" to agreements
to negotiate or mediate and further discussing the varied analyses courts apply to their
enforceability).
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they merely agreements to agree. They are middle-position agree-
ments that manifest the parties' commitment to engage in ADR in
hopes of reaching final settlements.
1. Over-Enforcement Problems
a. Intrusion on Contractual Liberty
Although a court's misapplication of the FAA or UAA may lead to
a proper result in some cases, this is not always true. As explained
above, misapplication of the Acts may lead to over-application of
strict statutory enforcement remedies and procedures. 87 For example,
a court's application of the FAA to a nonbinding determination may
allow the court to apply the Act's limited review to the determination
instead of de novo review. 88 This subjects parties to remedies that
drafters of the recently revised UAA refused to extend to agreements
to mediate. 89
Moreover, courts intrude on parties' autonomy and contractual lib-
erty when they equate nonbinding ADR with arbitration. This ig-
nores the parties' agreement and allows courts to automatically order
parties to engage in ADR without considering the context of the par-
ties' deal.90 This may also allow courts to ignore parties' preservation
of freedom from contract by effectively forcing them to reach a settle-
ment.91 Indeed, ADR agreements are distinguishable from arbitra-
tion agreements under the FAA or UAA because they preserve
parties' rights to refuse final settlement terms and to seek judicial re-
course if they are ultimately unable to settle their disputes through
ADR.
b. Coercion of Harmful Relations
Over-enforcement of ADR agreements based on quick yes-contract
analysis is also problematic when it results in coercive ADR that fuels
87. See id at 863 (stating concern with courts' misapplication of arbitration statutes to non-
binding ADR); see also Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 111 F.3d 343, 345-52 (3d Cir.
1997) (refusing to apply FAA interlocutory appeal provisions to nonbinding arbitration).
88. See Dow Corning Corp. v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., 335 F.3d 742, 746-52 (8th Cir. 2003)
(applying FAA § 10 review to a nonbinding third-party determination).
89. See Schmitz, supra note 8, at 7-8 (noting UAA drafters' decision).
90. Carol L. Izumi & Homer C. La Rue, Prohibiting "Good Faith" Reports Under the Uniform
Mediation Act: Keeping the Adjudication Camel out of the Mediation Tent, 2003 J. Disp. RESOL.
67, 74-80 (stating arguments against good-faith participation requirements in mandatory
mediation).
91. See Schmitz, supra note 8, at 58-59 (discussing courts' reliance on no-contract assumptions
regarding so-called "agreements to agree"). See generally BARNETT, supra note 82 (noting
courts' reluctance to enforce contracts that are contingent on the parties' further negotiations of
final terms).
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harmful relations. When courts fail to consider the realities of the
parties' relationship and the broad range of remedies they have for
enforcing ADR agreements, they fail to consider how participation in
an ADR process may harm disadvantaged parties. For example, a
court should not aid a party's use of an ADR process to tax the other
party's resources. Ordering participation in ADR may also be prob-
lematic where it would exacerbate parties' already strained relations. 92
Some relations may be so volatile that ordering participation in a me-
diation conference could incite physical violence or cause a party to
suffer emotional trauma. Some harassment claimants are so fearful of
an alleged harasser that they may develop illness from the stress of
having to sit through discussions in an informal conference room with
this individual.
In addition, forced participation in ADR could perpetuate dispro-
portionate exchange in uneven bargaining contexts. The pressure of a
closed conference room may exacerbate bargaining imbalances, mak-
ing it easier for parties to take advantage of those with less power,
experience, or resources. Furthermore, the blanket enforcement of
ADR agreements may invite strategic threats to require participation
in ADR to coerce parties into accepting one-sided settlement terms.93
c. Promotion of Futile Processes
The blanket enforcement of ADR agreements may also foster inef-
ficiency by forcing parties to complete futile processes. Clear enforce-
ment rules generally increase efficiency by providing certainty and
promoting private dispute resolution. It is inefficient, however, to
force parties to "go through the motions" of an ADR process when
the parties are adamantly opposed to participation. This may even
push parties away from the bargaining table.
Some commentators therefore argue that it is inappropriate for
courts to mandate nonconsensual mediation where "token compli-
ance" is likely to foster "cynicism and resentment" of the ADR pro-
92. See Schmitz, supra note 8, at 1-2 (discussing Vicky's hypothetical case); see also Stipa-
nowich, supra note 52, at 863, 868-69 (warning against application of arbitration statutes to me-
diation and other nonbinding ADR, and discussing difficulties of ordering participation in such
processes that generally require parties' cooperation).
93. See Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and
Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 46-71 (1999) (discussing why and when a party may seek an
injunction or specific performance to gain bargaining advantage although performance of the
contract would be inefficient).
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cess. 94 Disingenuous participation in ADR fosters inefficiency by
adding superficial layers to the litigation process and lowering parties'
"sense of procedural fairness" and faith in the justice system. 95
It also may be unwise for a court to order participation in ADR
where judicial intervention could upset organic dispute resolution.
This may be especially true for those within close-knit communities. 96
In these contexts, organic, reputation-based repercussions may result
in more durable solutions. Professor Bernstein, for example, found in
her study of the cotton industry that the communal nature of the in-
dustry fostered a private legal system that parties generally followed
without resorting to formal dispute resolution processes due to fear of
"reputation-based nonlegal sanctions. ' 97 Judicial intervention in this
organic process could cause parties to assume more defensive, litig-
ious attitudes and prevent future cooperation.
2. Under-Enforcement Problems
a. Rendering ADR Clauses Useless
Although participation in ADR can be unproductive, inefficient,
and even unpleasant in some cases, this does not mean courts should
never enforce ADR agreements. ADR agreements are an important
category in the range of contracting options and should not be cast
into the no-contract bin as empty "agreements to agree." This con-
dones noncompliance with ADR commitments and saps the power
from ADR clauses. Parties will not invest time and resources negoti-
ating or drafting ADR clauses if these clauses have little or no force.
Why carefully plan for flexible resolution of likely disputes by crafting
an ADR clause if a party may subsequently ignore it?
Some commentators argue that ADR's voluntary nature makes it
theoretically inconsistent to force compliance with an ADR agree-
ment, and that ADR is productive only if parties voluntarily submit to
the process.98 Other commentators add that there is no need for
courts to intervene to enforce ADR agreements because reputational
94. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the New
Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11, 44-47, 51 (2005) (questioning mandated mediation
from the perspective of democratic theory).
95. See Izumi & La Rue, supra note 90, at 74-75 (noting criticisms of mandatory mediation).
96. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MIcH. L. REV. 1724, 1745-87 (2001) (discussing the
cotton industry's Private Legal System (PLS)).
97. See id. (explaining the cotton industry's enforcement of the PLS through informal means
that foster cooperative behavior).
98. See Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1600
(2005) (emphasizing the "central irony" of mandatory ADR in light of ADR's voluntary nature).
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pressures and commercial ethics are better catalysts for encouraging
parties' compliance with the process.99
Although these are valid considerations, it is important to acknowl-
edge that pre-dispute ADR agreements often play an important role
in encouraging cooperative dispute resolution. Parties who accept
pre-dispute ADR agreements often refuse to even negotiate such
agreements after disputes arise.100 Once conflict erupts, parties be-
come entrenched in their positions. Contracting partners become de-
fensive and lose incentive to cooperate with one another. They may
refuse to agree to anything their opponent suggests in an attempt to
signal strength. These parties may fear that agreement reveals vulner-
ability, and they assume ADR disproportionately benefits the party
that requests it.
If parties have included an ADR clause in their pre-dispute con-
tract, however, they are more likely to participate in the prescribed
ADR process even if they would not have condoned it after their dis-
putes developed. 101 Furthermore, if they believe their agreement is
enforceable, they can "blame" their compliance on the agreement.
They can only rely on that contract promise, however, if it has some
force. Thus, ADR agreements should mean something.
In addition, it is sometimes the lawyers-not the disputing parties-
who resist participation in an ADR process.102 If ADR agreements
are easily avoidable, then lawyers may emphasize this to their clients
and dissuade them from participating in the process. Some lawyers
may even encourage litigation in order to gather statutory attorney's
fees, especially in class actions.
99. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 678 (noting "moral stricture of rather general acceptance" and
calling for compliance with promises).
100. See Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.
221, 248-49 (1997) (explaining how parties become entrenched in their defensive positions, and
are not likely to sign arbitration agreements after disputes arise); Daniel J. Guttman, For Better
or Worse, Till ADR Do Us Part: Using Antenuptial Agreements to Compel Alternatives to Tradi-
tional Adversarial Litigation, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 175, 185-88 (1996) (noting how
divorcing parties are unlikely to voluntarily agree to ADR after disputes arise, but instead act on
emotion and resort to traditional adversarial processes in an effort to harm one another); see
also Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Deliberation and Ne-
gotiation, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 231, 234-38, 283-84 (2005) (discussing importance of emo-
tion in decisionmaking, and emotion's epistemological function in negotiating and lawyering in
general).
101. Guttman, supra note 100, at 185-88.
102. See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43-49 (1982) (dis-
cussing lawyers' economic interests and fear of losing control as factors creating their reluctance
to mediate).
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b. Ignoring the Virtues of Promoting ADR
Why should the law promote participation in ADR? Modern Su-
preme Court FAA jurisprudence has exclaimed the virtues of arbitra-
tion and ADR as means for efficiently, flexibly, and peacefully
resolving disputes, and other courts have echoed such praises.10 3
ADR allows for greater flexibility than litigation or binding arbitra-
tion because parties may control their dispute resolution processes
and outcomes.'0 4 Parties also may benefit from having a third party
with specialized or technical training facilitate their dispute resolution
process. 10
5
ADR is also generally private, thereby allowing parties to resolve
disputes off the public record and outside a public forum. Privacy al-
lows the parties to "save face" by resolving their conflicts quietly with-
out the embarrassment of public defeat.'0 6 Such privacy often
benefits not only corporate parties but also employees and consumers
who wish to escape public trial. In addition, parties to private ADR
proceedings may be able to better protect business and other confi-
dences, regardless of whether the confidences would qualify for spe-
cial protection under judicial procedures.10 7
Proponents of ADR also emphasize that it may foster efficiency by
permitting parties to better control the business costs of conflict. Fur-
thermore, ADR helps lighten courts' caseloads because parties who
engage in ADR usually end their disputes without litigation, either
103. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). The
Supreme Court has reaffirmed strict enforcement of arbitration agreements in recent decisions.
See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000) (finding that the "liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" supported enforcement of an arbitration agree-
ment although the agreement was silent with respect to arbitration costs and fees (quoting
Moses, 460 U.S. at 24); see also IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 103 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir.
1996) (Posner, J.) (noting "Congress's emphatically expressed support for facilitating arbitration
in order to effectuate private ordering and lighten the caseload of the federal courts").
104. See Reuben, supra note 94, at 44-47 (explaining how mediating parties remain free to
litigate, and any settlement depends on the parties' additional consent, and also noting how
mediation's consensual process and autonomy value make it more democratic).
105. This has been popular in technical areas like patent disputes. See Christine Lepera, What
the Business Lawyer Needs to Know About ADR: New Areas in ADR, 578 PRACTISING L. INST.
LITIG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 709 (1998) (describing increased use of
arbitration to resolve disputes involving intellectual property rights, online technology, and en-
tertainment issues); Camille A. Laturno, Comment, International Arbitration of the Creative: A
Look at the World Intellectual Property Organization's New Arbitration Rules, 9 TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 357, 369-71 (1996) (discussing the evolution of arbitration in intellectual property disputes,
and emphasizing that arbitration is particularly appropriate for resolution of such disputes be-
cause they involve specialized and technical issues).
106. Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006)
(explaining benefits of arbitral privacy).
107. See id. (discussing privacy in arbitration).
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through the ADR process or during post-process settlement discus-
sions. Parties often report greater satisfaction with such settlements
than with binding judgments or arbitration awards because ADR al-
lows parties to claim ownership of the processes and outcomes. 10 8
Evidence suggests that even disputants who resist ADR still benefit
from participation in the process. 10 9 Studies of court-mandated medi-
ation have indicated that parties generally view mediation processes
as fair and efficient, unless mediators are overly evaluative or coercive
in forcing settlement. 10 Regardless of whether parties are initially re-
sistant to ADR, they report satisfaction with the process because it
gives them an opportunity to be heard that they likely would not get
through the regular litigation process.1"1 This may also produce more
peaceful and durable solutions because parties who feel they are
"heard" are more likely to abide by the agreements they ultimately
reach.
ADR may be beneficial even where it does not end the parties' dis-
pute.t12 Participation in ADR may provide collateral benefits because
it is generally less adversarial than litigation and arbitration and may
prevent the escalation of conflict.11 3 This is especially true in informal
mediations that allow parties to air their concerns in nonthreatening
atmospheres.t 1 4 Mediators may meet with parties individually to give
them equal opportunities to discuss their positions, or may moderate
more open and transparent group discussions. 115 In addition,
mediators may temper hostilities and foster civility. Although all
108. Tom R. Tyler et al., The Two Psychologies of Conflict Resolution: Differing Antecedents
of Pre-Experience Choices and Post-Experience Evaluations, 2 GROUP PROCESSES & INTER-
GROUP REL. 99, 116 (1999) (stating that mandatory participation in arbitration or mediation is
often psychologically satisfying to participants). See generally Roselle L. Wissler, The Effects of
Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on the Experience of Small Claims and Common
Pleas Courts, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 565 (1997) (citing studies that showed parties were gener-
ally equally satisfied with court-ordered and voluntary arbitration).
109. Frank E.A. Sander, The Future of ADR, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 3, 8-9 (noting that parties
benefit from the process even when they do not settle).
110. Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Les-
sons from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 425-27 (2004)
(reporting results of study).
111. Id. at 410-11 (reporting goals of court-connected mediation programs).
112. See Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of
Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 831,
836 (1998) (discussing relational benefits of mediation, even where required by law).
113. See Reuben, supra note 94, at 27 (emphasizing how dispute resolution may contribute to
productive and pleasant workplace culture by channeling tensions of conflict into a "constructive
direction as an agent of appropriate change").
114. See id. at 44-47.
115. Id. (noting how caucuses, or individual meetings with the parties, are "the antithesis of
transparency" and thus may harm the democratic character of the process).
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mediators are not equally effective, many are cognizant of power im-
balances and sufficiently savvy to protect parties from abuse. 116
c. Negative Impact on Bargaining Ethics
Classical contract law boasts a rigid "no-fault" regime that focuses
only on whether parties have complied with the clear terms of their
contracts. 117 Unlike tort and criminal law, contract law claims to re-
ject consideration of "good" or "bad" behavior or the relevance of
"willful" breach.118 Contract law generally disregards questions of
motive, allows for efficient breach, and avoids problems of subjective
inquiry and proof.1 19 It also has produced a caveat emptor approach
to bargaining and negotiations, which it justifies on the assumption
that contracts result from free choice.1 20 This formalist law frowns on
any special duties of kindness or good faith during negotiations, unless
the parties have a fiduciary relationship or violate another contract
defense.12 1
116. See Jordi Agustf-Panareda, Power Imbalances in Mediation: Questioning Some Common
Assumptions, May-June Disp. RESOL. J. 24, 29-31 (2004) (explaining how the voluntary nature,
empowerment function, and nonadversarial approach in mediation may protect mediating par-
ties from coerced settlements); Joel Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the
Law: Designing an Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 1997 J.
Disp. RESOL. 53, 76 (explaining how mediators may screen for and employ techniques to deal
with power imbalances); Sander, supra note 109, at 7-8 (noting that most mediators are reputa-
ble, and will not coerce settlements, but acknowledging that there may be a need for greater
public oversight of mediators to promote fairness).
117. Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 293, 293
(1975); see also Michel Rosenfeld, Contract ahd Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract
Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 776-79 (1985) (highlighting contract
law's rejection of any "social organization that seeks to impose a particular vision of the good
above all others").
118. 5A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1123 (1964) (further stating that
concerns for willfulness indicate "childlike faith in the existence of a plain and obvious line
between the good and the bad, between unfortunate virtue and unforgivable sin").
119. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.17a (3d ed. 2004) (ex-
plaining bases for contract law's avowed disregard of willfulness).
120. See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 743 (1979) (explain-
ing how classical law used will theory to justify presumed enforcement of contracts); Philip
Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 70 U. CH. L. REV.
1513, 1516-19 (2003) (emphasizing centrality of free will in contract theory); Nicola W. Palmieri,
Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV.
70, 75-78, 107-20 (1993) (discussing how caveat emptor has prevailed in American contract law,
but proposing that this should be tempered by a precontractual duty to negotiate in good faith
under modern contract law).
121. See Epstein, supra note 117, at 293, 295-301 (emphasizing how fraud, duress, undue in-
fluence, and incompetence do not call courts to assess the fairness or reasonableness of substan-
tive contract terms, but expressing concern with minimizing the cost associated with application
of incompetence defense).
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This formalist view has been revived and reinforced by law and eco-
nomics scholars. 122 Many of these scholars insist that contracts should
be enforced as written, and that courts should resist "the tug to a more
paternalistic conception of the judicial role in enforcing contracts. 1' 23
They suggest that this formalist regime promotes the parties' long-
term interests and efficient distribution of resources for the public at
large. 124 They therefore reject any inquiry regarding the moral justifi-
cations for enforcing contracts based on apparent "consent" at the
time of contract. 125
Although efficiency and certainty are important considerations, jus-
tice and good faith remain central to contract equations. 26 Aristote-
lian notions of "rectificatory," or corrective, justice in contractual
dealings survive in courts' assessments of bargaining conduct. 2 7 Fur-
thermore, we share universal standards of fairness, divinely and secu-
larly formulated, by virtue of our "common humanity. ' 128 Hobbes
echoed that reason and public order dictated "natural" or "moral"
122. See Brian Bix, Epstein, Craswell, Economics, Unconscionability, and Morality, 19 QUIN-
NIPIAC L. REV. 715, 715-20 (2000) ("The virtuous prefer good, villains prefer bad, and rational
actors in economics prefer themselves." (quoting Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law
and Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for the "Bad Man" of Holmes, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 903, 903-04 (1998))).
123. Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1986).
124. Bix, supra note 122, at 717 (noting how works of Professor Epstein and other law-and-
economics theorists suggest that presumed enforcement of so-called adhesion contracts may be
in "the long-term interests of those who sign" them).
125. See id. at 720-21 (emphasizing that few scholars "dig[ ] down deep as one might into the
moral question: why, or under what circumstances, should 'consent' justify state enforcement of
agreements?"). To be sure, it would be inefficient for every court to consider "deep questions of
moral justifications of consent" in every case. Id. at 720. Furthermore, any critique of presumed
enforcement must be careful to consider whether a better approach will have better or worse
long-term effects. Id. at 720-21; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its
Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 744-51 (1982) (discussing "the bargain principle," which assumes
courts should not question the substantive fairness or adequacy of consideration for contracts).
126. See Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 787 (2002) (noting how fairness matters despite scholars' disclaimers
of its relevance and assumptions that "economic Darwinism" allows those with power to use that
power to obtain more).
127. HENRY MATHER, CONTRACT LAW AND MORALITY 45-47 (1999) (emphasizing how "Ar-
istotelian rectificatory justice is linked to morality in a very direct and pervasive way," and ex-
plaining how this theory of justice bases remedy on "whether the defendant's conduct was
morally wrongful" although it seeks to limit the remedy to restoring the status quo ante).
128. See Charles L. Barzun, Common Sense and Legal Science, 90 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1058-71,
1079-88 (2004) (discussing legal science of inductive discovery of "moral" truths, derived from
natural experience and common sense, and emphasizing how natural assumptions of fairness and
equality limited the caveat emptor norm in American courts); Larry A. DiMatteo, The History
of Natural Law Theory: Transforming Embedded Influences into a Fuller Understanding of Mod-
ern Contract Law, 60 U. Prr. L. REV. 839, 861-62, 868-69 (1999) (noting how Cicero believed
obligations should promote civic virtue, and Hegelians rejected strict individualism to the detri-
ment of communal values).
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precepts for humankind's peaceful survival, 129 which included the ob-
ligation to perform private contracts.130 Bargaining ethics are there-
fore woven into our social and legal culture.131 They resonate in
contract doctrines such as unconscionability 132 and in duties under the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the UCC to perform contracts
in good faith. 133 The duty of good faith and fair dealing thus applies
to parties' performance of contract duties. 134
Accordingly, contract law should require parties to keep their ADR
promises and follow through with commitments to cooperate in good
faith.135 Of course, the meaning of "good faith" in a given context is
problematic. This is not, however, a sufficient reason to cast it
aside. 136 The enforcement of good-faith compliance with ADR agree-
ments serves societal interests by reinforcing parties' confidence in
their contracts137 and promoting promise-keeping and good-faith bar-
gaining.138 Private law is not nearly as amoral as it claims to be. 139
129. Anita L. Allen & Maria H. Morales, Hobbes, Formalism, and Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA
L. REV. 713, 718 (1992) (explaining how Hobbes viewed submission to a sovereign and "natural
laws" as necessary to quell humankind's "natural condition" of war).
130. Id. at 719. In Hobbes's view, individuals have a duty to justly perform their contracts
regardless of the sovereign's demands. Id.
131. See Palmieri, supra note 120, at 72-74 (highlighting good faith and fair dealing as "a
fundamental commandment of social behavior").
132. See id. at 72-77 (emphasizing that ethics and morality have always been part of our con-
ceptions of contracting and have formed foundations for duties of good faith that prevail in civil
law and survive in modern contract law). Despite the current return to formalism and economic
preoccupancy, concern for fairness has thankfully survived. See Knapp, supra note 126, at
790-98 (discussing fairness of mandatory arbitration and very real concerns regarding stolen
access to the courts).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (stating that "[e]very contract im-
poses upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforce-
ment"): U.C.C. § 1-203 (2002) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
134. Prof'l Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Kimbrell, 834 F. Supp. 1305, 1310 (D. Kan. 1993); see also
Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill. v. CDL Hotels U.S.A., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 482, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(emphasizing how the duty of good faith applies to performance of contract duties but does not
extend to future negotiations).
135. Charles L. Knapp, The Promise of the Future-and Vice Versa: Some Reflections on the
Metamorphosis of Contract Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 932, 950-52 (1984) (highlighting the impor-
tance of promoting socially desirable outcomes through contract law, regardless of efficiency);
see also Palmieri, supra note 120, at 75-77, 105-08, 199-201 (noting doctrines protecting bargain-
ing morality and proposing duty to negotiate in good faith).
136. See infra notes 223-235 and accompanying text (discussing tensions involved with enforc-
ing ADR agreements).
137. See Izumi & La Rue, supra note 90, at 71-73 (noting arguments favoring mandatory
mediation).
138. See Knapp, supra note 135, at 951 (emphasizing that "promise-keeping in general is not
merely praiseworthy behavior, but an absolutely necessary glue for holding society together").
139. See James Gordley, The Moral Foundations of Private Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 22-23
(2002) (drawing on work of the "Late Scholatics" in discussing moral foundations of contract
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Moreover, requiring good-faith participation in ADR pursuant to con-
tract promises in fact comports with both modern efficiency and classi-
cal contract principles.
B. Inefficiency of Uncertain and Confused Analysis of
ADR Agreements
1. Absence of Guidelines for Courts and Practitioners
There remains a thorny question: "To enforce or not to enforce?"
Courts have exacerbated the uncertainties of finding answers by dodg-
ing the question under the guise of a yes-contract/no-contract regime,
and legislators and policymakers have similarly declined to confront
enforcement of ADR agreements.
Recently, the National Council of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) had an opportunity to clarify enforcement rules for
mediation as it revised the UAA and crafted the Uniform Mediation
Act (UMA). NCCUSL failed to take advantage of this opportunity,
however, by declining to mandate summary enforcement or to set
other enforcement standards for promises to participate in media-
tion. 140 Revisors of the UAA and drafters of the UMA determined
that the summary enforcement scheme of the UAA is ill-suited for
mediation, and assumed that the common law adequately addresses
enforcement of ADR agreements. 141 In addition, they indicated that
the UAA should not extend to mediation because it would eliminate
legal-process protections that apply in other contract cases.1 42
Policymakers have also avoided setting standards for fair bargain-
ing.143 The UMA drafters declined to prescribe how courts or
mediators should police the behavior of ADR participants. Similarly,
the proposed Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators
promulgated by a committee of the American Bar Association
(ABA), American Arbitration Association (AAA), and Association
law, and concluding that we must escape the "circle of modern ideas" to understand economics
and law).
140. See UNIF. MEDIATION AcT (UMA) § 5(i) (Annual Meeting Draft, July 23-30, 1999) (not-
ing that the National Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) recently
considered and rejected expansion of the UAA to mandate specific enforcement of agreements
to mediate). In addition, drafters of the UMA did not prescribe enforcement legislation regard-
ing enforcement of agreements to mediate because they assumed that common contract law
provides for enforcement analysis. See generally UNIF. MEDIATION Acr (2001), reprinted in 22
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 165 (2002) (providing final draft without summary enforcement provisions)
[hereinafter UMA].
141. See Schmitz, supra note 8, at 12-14 (discussing NCCUSL's decision not to prescribe sum-
mary enforcement for agreements to mediate).
142. Id.
143. See Izumi & La Rue, supra note 90, at 71-76.
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for Conflict Resolution, do not prescribe rules for enforcing ADR
agreements. 144 Instead, the proposed standards reinforce the volun-
tary nature of mediation, while also stressing a mediator's duty to pro-
mote "diligence, timeliness, safety, presence of the appropriate
participants, party participation, procedural fairness, party compe-
tency and mutual respect among all participants.' '1 45
Courts and policymakers have failed to clarify, or even confront,
thorny questions regarding the enforcement of ADR agreements and
have left parties with little guidance as to the enforceability of their
ADR agreements. Understandably, courts and commentators disa-
gree about whether, when, and how to enforce ADR agreements.
They should rethink their yes-contract/no-contract regime, however,
in order to protect bargaining integrity and the efficacy of ADR
agreements. 146
2. Increased Litigation over ADR
While courts and commentators avoid difficult questions regarding
enforcement of ADR agreements, parties continue to sue one another
over their ADR promises. 147 Without clear guidance, parties are
often uncertain about the enforceability of their ADR agreements.
They therefore waste their time and resources, as well as those of the
courts, fighting about how they will resolve their fights. 148
In Marland v. Safeway, Inc. 149 for example, the parties spent signifi-
cant resources litigating disputes arising out of a postsettlement con-
tract containing an ADR clause, which was intended to save them the
headaches of further litigation. °50 The first disputes erupted in 1993,
when Marland sued Safeway on claims relating to its contract to sell
144. See generally MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (Am. Arbitration
Ass'n, Am. Bar Ass'n & Ass'n for Conflict Resolution 2005), available at http://morit-
zlaw.osu.edu/programs/adr/msoc/pdf/standards-090805.pdf [hereinafter MEDIATOR
STANDARDS].
145. Id. Standards I, VI.
146. See Temkin, supra note 10, at 132, 160-61 (emphasizing ambiguities of courts' "all-or-
nothing" enforcement of duties to negotiate, and concluding that there was "no judicially recog-
nized theory of an appropriate remedy" for enforcing duties to negotiate in good faith).
147. See, e.g., HIM Portland, L.L.C. v. DeVito Builders, Inc., 317 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 2003)
(exemplifying lengthy litigation regarding a contract to mediate before seeking arbitration).
148. See id. (debating the duty to mediate all the way to the First Circuit Court of Appeals,
where the court dismissed the motion to compel arbitration because the parties failed to mediate
as a condition precedent to arbitration); see also Vestar Dev. II, L.L.C. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.,
249 F.3d 958, 959-62 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing the "unsettled nature" of the enforceability of
an agreement to negotiate in good faith, and therefore opting to finally end the parties' years of
litigating a breach of duty to negotiate claim based on the claimant's failure to prove damages).
149. 65 Fed. App'x 442 (4th Cir. 2003).
150. Id. at 444-48.
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cleaning products to Safeway. The parties settled these disputes prior
to trial and signed a new three-year sales contract that included a
clause requiring them to pursue ADR in good faith to settle any fu-
ture disputes. 151 Despite this clause, the disputes continued and Mar-
land sued Safeway on various claims, including breach of the ADR
agreement. 52 The parties then wasted three more years litigating
these claims, which federal courts ultimately rejected. 153
The litigation produced nothing more than mixed messages regard-
ing the viability of claims for breach of ADR agreements. The district
court found that no claim existed for breach of the duty to mediate,
but the appellate court stated, "Marland may at one time have had an
action for specific performance to compel mediation.' 54 The court
affirmed summary judgment for Safeway on Marland's breach of the
ADR agreement claim, however, because Marland failed to prove
that the damages were foreseeable to Safeway at the time the parties
signed their second contract. 155 The court therefore seemed to indi-
cate that Marland's only remedy for breach of the ADR agreement
would have been to obtain an order compelling mediation. 156 The
court's use of the word "may," however, left the parties wondering
whether it would have actually condoned specific enforcement of the
mediation agreement.
IV. RECOGNIZING VALID ADR AGREEMENTS AND DUTIES TO
PERFORM THEM IN GOOD FAITH
Courts should no longer collapse questions regarding validity and
enforcement of ADR agreements into one yes-contract/no-contract
conclusion as they have done with respect to other contracts to bar-
gain. Instead, they should separately determine (1) whether a valid
ADR agreement exists and (2) how to enforce that agreement, all the
while giving due regard to the flexible middle-position character of
these agreements. With respect to step one, this Article merely pro-
poses that courts promote the certainty and efficacy of ADR agree-
ments by confirming the validity of such agreements when they are
supported by offer, acceptance, and consideration. The Article also
acknowledges the imprecise nature of these agreements, however, by
inviting courts to ease their current formalist analysis of ADR agree-
151. Id. at 444-45.
152. Id. at 445-49.
153. Id. at 445-49 & n.3 (reporting that these claims were first filed on July 28, 2000).
154. Id. at 448-49.
155. Marland, 65 Fed. App'x at 448-49.
156. See id.
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ments and use duties of good faith to fill the agreements' understanda-
ble gaps. Furthermore, the second step of the approach calls on
courts to consider context and post-contract relations in deciding
when breaches have occurred and what remedies are available for en-
forcing valid ADR agreements.
A. Presence of Contractual Ingredients at Contract Formation
Parties to pre-dispute ADR agreements include these agreements
in their overall deals, often not expecting they will encounter disputes.
They may offer, accept, and provide consideration for an ADR clause
in their deals as means for avoiding the time and expense of litigating
future disputes. In such cases, formalist contract rules would dictate
that courts enforce these exchanges of promises, provided they sur-
vive traditional contract defenses. 157 This is especially true in light of
public policy promoting ADR as means for easing the burden on the
courts.158 As one court noted with respect to agreements to negotiate,
"[a] contract, after all, is 'an agreement to do or not to do a certain
thing.' ",59
Nonetheless, courts have narrowed their applications of offer, ac-
ceptance, and consideration standards to ADR agreements, thereby
avoiding the more intricate difficulties of crafting proper enforcement
remedies. They often assume ADR agreements are too indefinite or
are otherwise unenforceable "agreements to agree. ' 160 Courts should
broaden their analysis to recognize that ADR agreements are differ-
ent from "agreements to agree" in that they do not require that par-
ties reach an agreement in order to have meaning. 161 Enforcement of
an ADR agreement should focus on process-not result. Contract
law, which holds parties to their promises, should apply to commit-
ments to engage in ADR processes. 162 Indeed, ADR agreements indi-
157. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 2.5,2.11,4.2, 9.1
(4th ed. 1998) (explaining basics of offer, acceptance, and consideration, but also providing that
an agreement may be void or voidable "because it is contaminated by duress, undue influence,
misrepresentation, mistake, or unconscionability"); see also id. at §§ 9.2, 9.9, 9.10, 9.13, 9.25, 9.37,
9.38 (setting forth bases and elements of these defenses).
158. See, e.g., Pearson v. Dist. Court, 924 P.2d 512, 515-16 (Colo. 1996) (en banc) (finding
courts have power to order parties to mediate in the interest of "just, speedy, and economic
resolution of disputes").
159. Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 880 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1549 (West 1982)).
160. See id. (finding same with respect to contracts to negotiate); see also supra notes 69-83
and accompanying text (discussing how ADR agreements, like other contracts to bargain, are
not agreements to agree).
161. Copeland, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 880-81.
162. This distinction has led some courts to be less resistant to enforcing contracts to negotiate
terms of a deal. Id. at 882 (gathering citations).
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cate a firm commitment to participate in an ADR process and are not
merely agreements to agree that require compliance with a contem-
plated but uncompleted contract.163
A California Court of Appeals explained the difference between
unenforceable agreements to agree and enforceable ADR agreements
in Copeland v. Baskin Robbins, U.S.A. 164 In that case, Baskin Robbins
and Copeland signed a statement agreeing to many terms regarding a
co-packing arrangement under which Copeland would purchase Bas-
kin Robbins's ice cream manufacturing plant, and Baskin Robbins
would in turn agree to purchase ice cream from Copeland.165 The par-
ties continued negotiations but never finalized key terms such as price
because Baskin Robbins suddenly broke off discussions due to "stra-
tegic decisions" it had made about its business.1 66 The court found
that Copeland could have a claim for breach of their agreement to
negotiate because it was not merely an agreement to agree that evi-
denced the parties' intent to remain uncommitted until they formal-
ized their agreement. 167
ADR agreements are distinguishable from agreements to agree be-
cause they require the parties to do something-to engage in ADR.
In Gillenardo v. Connor Broadcasting Delaware Co.,168 for example,
the court found the parties' contractual duties to negotiate "to be real,
not illusory," where the plaintiff had offered to negotiate in good faith
to buy the defendant's radio stations, and the defendant had accepted
that offer by executing a letter of intent to work diligently to finalize a
sales agreement. 169 This did not mean, however, that the defendant
was obligated to actually finalize the sales contract. It was not an
agreement to sell. 170
The first step in my proposed analysis therefore comports with
traditional contract rules. It reinforces that courts should consider of-
fer, acceptance, and consideration in assessing the validity of ADR
agreements. Nonetheless, the proposal asks courts to ease the formal-
ism of their traditional analysis and to find ADR agreements enforce-
able even if they do not delineate clear standards for compliance. In
other words, courts should not unduly focus on the specificity of terms
as a means for avoiding intricate difficulties of determining enforce-
163. Id.
164. Id. at 880.
165. Id. at 876-78.
166. Id. at 878-79.
167. Copeland, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881-82.
168. No. C.A. 98C-06-015 WLW, 2002 WL 991110, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2002).
169. Id. at *6-8.
170. Id.
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ment remedies. Admittedly, ADR agreements are murky because
they preserve parties' freedom to control the ADR process and reject
any settlement of their disputes. Courts should nonetheless recognize
the validity of ADR agreements marked by offer, acceptance, and
consideration in order to protect their relevance and efficacy.
B. Recognition of Good-Faith Duties to Fill Gaps in
ADR Agreements
In recognizing the validity of ADR agreements, courts should also
appreciate the duty to perform these agreements in good faith and use
this duty to fill the agreements' understandable gaps. Despite the fact
that courts and legislators have espoused support for ADR, they have
declined to delineate standards for compliance with ADR agree-
ments. 171 At the same time, formalist trends have disempowered du-
ties of good faith that contract law has traditionally required for the
performance of all contracts.172 Contract law implies such duties in
recognition of the reality that "[c]ontracts are always more than the
contract document."'1 73 Furthermore, implying duties of good faith ef-
fectuates the parties' reasonable expectations 174 and fills the gaps in-
evitably left open in ADR agreements. 175
171. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-502 to 22-507 (1989) (Colorado International Dis-
pute Resolution Act exemplifying law encouraging use of mediation and conciliation but failing
to provide standards or guidelines for participation in these processes); see also Vestar Dev. II,
L.L.C. v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 959-62 (9th Cir. 2001) (highlighting the unclear
law regarding the existence and enforceability of agreement to negotiate in good faith); supra
notes 140-146 and accompanying text (discussing UMA drafters' and other policymakers' avoid-
ance of mediation definition and enforcement issues).
172. See, e.g., Teri J. Dobbins, Losing Faith: Extracting the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
from (Some) Contracts, 84 OR. L. REV. 227, 227-33 (2005) (advocating the demise of the implied
covenant of good faith in some contracts). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 205 (1981) (recognizing duties of good-faith performance); Palmieri, supra note 120, at 88-99
(discussing basic contract law requiring good-faith performance of contract duties).
173. D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Interpretation of
Venture Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825, 844-45 (2004) (quoting Stewart Macau-
lay, The Real Deal and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the
Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 Moo. L. REV. 44, 45 (2003)) (explaining that the implied
duty of good-faith attempts to effectuate what the parties would have contracted for had they
thought to negotiate the issue).
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmts. a & c (1981) (recognizing duty of
good faith, but noting it generally does not apply to the formation of a contract); Copeland v.
Baskin Robbins U.S.A., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 883 (Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting Baskin Robbins's
argument that requiring good faith in an agreement to negotiate would discourage parties from
even beginning negotiations due to fear that liability would attach).
175. See Michael L. Moffitt, Schmediation and the Dimensions of Definition, 10 HARV. NEG.
L. REV. 69, 79-84, 100-01 (2005) (explaining how the definition of mediation itself depends on
context, although some seek to define it prescriptively in hopes of protecting "moral integrity" of
the process); Vanessa Sims, Good Faith in Contract Law: Of Triggers and Concentric Circles, 16
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1. Currently Disempowered Duties of Good Faith
Courts and commentators debate the legitimacy of good-faith duties
and whether good faith requires subjective honesty or objectively rea-
sonable behavior.17 6 They also disagree about whether duties of good
faith should apply to protect reasonable expectations regarding partic-
ipation in ADR processes.177 Formalist trends, however, have op-
posed implied duties of good faith on the ground that such duties
allow courts too much latitude in defining good faith, akin to Justice
Stewart's "I know it when I see it" approach to obscenity.178 Accord-
ingly, most courts and commentators have rejected proactive attempts
to delineate standards to participate in ADR in good faith.
Nonetheless, Professor Kimberlee Kovach has delineated a list of
good-faith participation standards which includes compliance with any
contract, judicial, or statutory terms, attendance at dispute resolution
sessions with full authority to settle, preparation for such sessions, and
meaningful participation in the sessions.17 9 This list also requires par-
ties to refrain from misleading disputants, defying mediators' direc-
tives, or abandoning the process before the mediator declares an
impasse or otherwise excuses the parties. 180 Meanwhile, Susan Ober-
man has proposed a looser definition of good faith aimed at protecting
autonomy in ADR and the wide range of models and values dispute
resolution may serve.'81 She defines good faith as requiring that par-
ties mediate with "intention and authority to negotiate," and that they
"provide necessary documentation or information. ' 18 2
KING'S C. L.J. 293, 293-95, 302-07 (2005) (discussing controversy regarding good faith in En-
glish contract law, and finding that the standard must be contextual and practical).
176. See Roger L. Carter, Oh, Ye of Little [Good] Faith: Questions, Concerns and Commen-
tary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 367, 368-78
(discussing conflicting views of the meaning of good-faith participation in mediation).
177. See Roy Kreitner, Frameworks of Cooperation: Competing, Conflicting, and Joined Inter-
ests in Contract and Its Surroundings, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 59, 87-93 (2005) (discussing
how conflict of interest theory narrows any contractual duties of good faith)..
178. See Dobbins, supra note 172, at 227-33 (critiquing implied duties of good faith in certain
contexts); Kreitner, supra note 177, at 87-93.
179. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended, or Re-
quired? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575, 615-16 (1997).
180. Id. at 600-22.
181. See Susan Oberman, Mediation Theory vs. Practice: What Are We Really Doing? Re-
Solving a Professional Conundrum, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 775, 776-86, 795-98 (2005)
(discussing spectrum of mediation models and basic elements of self-determination in
mediation).
182. Id. at 798. By requiring that parties indicate commitment in this way, Oberman's defini-
tion also seems to comport with courts' definition of the duty to collectively negotiate labor
disputes in good faith in a manner aimed "to resolve differences and reach a common under-
standing." Bon Homme County Comm'n v. Am. Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees,
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Some courts also have indicated a willingness to recognize a good-
faith duty to refrain from interfering with others' "reasonable expecta-
tions" regarding performance of their ADR agreements.1l 3 These
courts recognize that good faith should preclude parties from harming
each other's rights to enjoy the "fruits of the contract. ' 184 One court,
for example, affirmed a jury finding of bad-faith breach of an agree-
ment to negotiate where the defendant provided "disingenuous" ex-
cuses or reasons for breaking off negotiations. 185 The court explained
that parties must refrain from "arbitrary or unreasonable conduct
which has the effect of preventing the other party to the contract from
receiving the fruits of the contract."'1 86
Imposing any level of compliance with duties to pursue ADR in
good faith is controversial because it is arguably inconsistent with
ADR's consensual nature. 187 Most courts and commentators have
therefore criticized "reasonable expectations" definitions of the im-
plied duty of good faith.18 8 They worry that imposing proactive good-
faith duties may effectively force the parties to settle their disputes or
offer certain settlement amounts. In Indiana v. Carter,1 89 for example,
the court rejected a finding that the state failed to act in good faith by
offering only a $3,000 settlement amount during mediation of a tort
claim.1 90 The court therefore reversed an order against the state to
pay sanctions and costs, and emphasized that the $3,000 offer did not
represent the kind of bad faith required for a court to impinge on
parties' autonomy in ADR. 191 The court also explained that settle-
ment is not the only goal of ADR; it may also be useful in facilitating
Local 1743A, 699 N.W.2d 441, 444-48 (S.D. 2005) (imposing such a duty to collectively negotiate
under South Dakota law).
183. See Dobbins, supra note 172, at 252 (discussing various definitions and debate among and
within jurisdictions).
184. Id.
185. Gillenardo v. Connor Broad. Del. Co., No. C.A. 98C-06-015 WLW, 2002 WL 991110, at
*8-9 (Del. Super Ct. Apr. 30, 2002).
186. Id. at *8.
187. See Reuben, supra note 94, at 50-51 (noting disagreement with proposals that mediation
may be unilaterally imposed). There are valid criticisms of court-mandated ADR with respect to
possible coerced settlement and inefficiency of token compliance with unilaterally imposed pro-
grams. Id. With respect to enforcement of ADR agreements, however, the parties have con-
sented to engage in the ADR process. Accordingly, it seems courts should enforce these
consensual promises, although they must do so carefully and without effectively forcing settle-
ment. Of course, this leads to difficult inquiries regarding levels and types of proof, as well as
remedies, for breach of ADR duties.
188. See Dobbins, supra note 172, at 255-59 (critiquing definitions of good faith).
189. 658 N.E.2d 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
190. Id. at 620-22.
191. Id. at 623-24.
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the exchange of information, reducing misunderstandings, and clarify-
ing priorities. 192
Similarly, the court in Avril v. Civilmart 93 emphasized that courts
should not order sanctions against a party for offering small settle-
ment amounts.' 94 In that case, the court reversed the trial court's
sanctions order against a defendant for failure to mediate in good
faith based on the defendant's refusal to offer more than $1,000 as a
final settlement of plaintiff's car collision case. 195 The court explained
that sanctions are proper only against a party that shows actual bad
faith by not attending the mediation or by refusing to comply with an
agreement term. 196
In this way, most courts define good faith to preclude only clear and
objective bad-faith breach under what some refer to as "excluder
analysis.' 97 In Office Environments, Inc. v. Lake States Insurance
Co.,' 98 for example, the court affirmed dismissal with prejudice of a
plaintiff's claim as a proper sanction for the plaintiff's failure to com-
ply with the court's mediation order pursuant to local rules. 199 The
plaintiff derailed the process in bad faith by causing the mediator to
cancel the mediation after the plaintiff neglected to pay the mediator's
retainer fee and contributed to over five years of delays by reschedul-
ing the mediation three times.200 Furthermore, the court refused to
consider the plaintiff's last-minute objections to the mediation order
and fee, which the plaintiff finally raised after the court dismissed the
case.
201
Mediation practitioners and commentators also have been unwilling
to announce clear criteria for good-faith participation in ADR. They
discussed the difficulties of defining good faith at the American Jour-
nal of Trial Advocacy's 2004 Symposium on Issues Affecting the Pro-
192. Id.
193. 605 So. 2d 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
194. Id. at 989-90.
195. Id. at 989-92.
196. Id.; see also Wholesale Tape & Supply Co. v. Icode, Inc., No. 1:04-CV-266, 2005 WL
3535148, at *8-10 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 22, 2005) (explaining that "good faith imposes 'an honest
intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the
forms and technicalities of the law'" in rejecting an argument that the defendant failed to act in
good faith by refusing to pay plaintiff the refund it requested (quoting Lane v. John Deere Co.,
767 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tenn. 1989))).
197. Dobbins, supra note 172, at 271-73 (explaining Professor Summers's "excluder
analysis").
198. 833 N.E.2d 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
199. Id. at 494-96.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 495-96 (noting that defendant wasted time and resources preparing for the sched-
uled mediation sessions that plaintiff cancelled on short notice).
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fessional Mediator.20 2 Jack Cooley, chair of the ABA Dispute
Resolution Section, offered the most extensive discussion of good
faith. He explained that the hurdles of defining and enforcing good-
faith participation in court-ordered mediation led the ABA to con-
clude that parties should be sanctioned only for objectively bad-faith
conduct, such as failing to attend mediation. 203 This has also
prompted the ABA to reject adoption of rules requiring that parties
attend mediation with settlement authority or that they make a settle-
ment offer during a mediation.20 4 In addition, other commentators
have rejected any attempts to impose more subjective standards of
good faith.20 5
Although most see good faith as a "good thing" in theory, there is
no generally accepted definition of good faith, let alone a duty to par-
ticipate in ADR in 'good faith.206 The most we can glean from the
cases is a tenuous "excluder analysis" that relies on a circular defini-
tion of good faith: good faith means no bad faith. But the meaning of
"bad faith" inevitably depends on how parties expect each other to
behave in "good faith." An excluder analysis also is different from a
more proactive "reasonable expectations" definition of good faith
with respect to burdens of proof and definition. An excluder analysis
places the burden on the party asserting breach to show that the other
behaved in a manner blatantly hostile to the ADR agreement. A
more proactive definition requires the parties to comply with good-
faith standards determined in light of parties' reasonable expectations.
This means parties asserting breach bear a heavier burden of proof
under the excluder analysis, while courts bear a heavier burden seek-
ing to define good-faith standards under a reasonable expectations
analysis. Furthermore, courts have narrowed the application of the
excluder analysis by rarely finding bad faith and by seeking avenues
for avoiding the difficulties of contextually analyzing parties' ADR
agreements.
202. William W. Huss, et al., The Legal Foundation-Defining the Legislative Format, 28 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 19, 19-28 (2004).
203. Id. at 38-39.
204. Id.
205. See Carter, supra note 176, at 379 (explaining the "moderate approach" some commenta-
tors suggest for prescribing enforcement of objective good faith such as "compliance with proce-
dural rules and orders, completion and exchange of pre-mediation forms, and physical presence
at the mediation," while rejecting subjective rules "more closely linked to a party's intent").
206. See Dobbins, supra note 172, at 252-55 (discussing various definitions and debate among
and within jurisdictions).
[Vol. 56:55
2006] GIVING MEANING TO GOOD FAITH IN ADR 89
2. A Proposed Approach for Reinvigorating Duties of Good Faith
to Fill Gaps in ADR Agreements
The prevailing excluder analysis of good faith typifies the strategy
of avoidance that courts employ in analyzing contracts to bargain. If
courts were to honestly confront the meaning of good faith, they
would have to consider context in determining the parties' reasonable
expectations. Instead, courts use the excluder approach to cast aside
claims of breach of ADR agreements and to avoid even attempting to
give meaning to promises to participate in ADR. Although this may
conserve judicial resources, it undervalues parties' promises to pursue
cooperative processes and hinders the efficiency of ADR agreements
by leaving parties without contracting guidance. Parties are left won-
dering whether it is worthwhile to even include ADR agreements in
their contracts, let alone take them seriously when disputes arise.
Accordingly, contextual good-faith duties to cooperate that may be
improper in arm's length pre-contract negotiations, may nonetheless
be appropriate and necessary to enforce ADR agreements. 20 7 Courts
should not avoid setting good-faith standards by defining good faith as
merely excluding blatant bad faith. Instead, they should provide real
contracting guidance and recognize that contextual good-faith stan-
dards may be necessary in some cases in order to properly enforce
parties' ADR promises and promote the efficacy and efficiency of
ADR.20 8
Courts should use express contract terms as the starting point for
determining what good faith requires under an ADR agreement to
give effect to procedures parties delineate in their contracts. This fo-
cus on contract terms should also promote contract compliance and
efficiency, and may prompt parties to more carefully construct their
ADR agreements. Courts must look beyond ADR agreement terms,
however, because parties to ADR agreements rarely delineate clear
ADR procedures or participation standards in their contracts. Courts
should require, at a minimum, that parties initiate the ADR process
and cooperate in that process until it legitimately becomes futile or
counterproductive. This should also require that parties offer each
207. See Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Recon-
ciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76
IND. L.J. 591, 604-06 (2001) (discussing mediator and participant misconduct, especially preva-
lent in uneven bargaining contexts).
208. See Carter, supra note 176, at 393 n.187 (noting some courts' and commentators' advo-
cacy of more subjective standards as necessary to promote cooperative ADR and protect the
integrity of an ADR process).
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other a real opportunity to air their claims and participate in the
process.20 9
In order to ensure a "real opportunity" to be heard, parties cannot
derail the process or take opportunistic advantage of gaps they have
intentionally left in the ADR agreement. 210 Applying Professor Ben-
Shahar's "no-retraction" principle, a retracting party should not be
able to walk away from a commitment to participate cooperatively in
an ADR process without liability.211 However, courts should fill gaps
parties have left in their ADR agreements with terms most favorable
to the retracting party.212 This gives would-be retractors incentive to
pursue the process, unafraid that they will become subject to onerous
obligations by initiating ADR discussions. 213 It also prevents parties
from being forced to settle or offer certain settlement amounts, and
should allow parties to withdraw from a truly unproductive or unsatis-
fying ADR process without having to provide "proper reason" or spe-
cific justification. 214
In addition, although the claimant would bear the ultimate burden
of proving the alleged retractor breached the ADR agreement, a re-
tractor seeking to fill gaps in the agreement with its favored terms
would have to show that those terms are reasonable in light of the
parties' relationship. This is appropriate because that party will usu-
ally have both the incentive and the information to prove the reasona-
bleness of its reading of the contract. This, in turn, may ease the
court's burden in filling gaps, thereby lowering costs and improving
209. See Philip J. Harter, A Plumber Responds to the Philosophers: A Comment on Professor
Menkel-Meadow's Essay on Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 379, 385-87 (2004) (explaining
that those affected by a decisionmaking process should have the opportunity to participate in
that process); Katherine R. Kruse, Learning from Practice: What ADR Needs from a Theory of
Justice, 5 NEV. L.J. 389, 395-96 (2005) (discussing the role of authentic participation in court-
connected ADR).
210. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar, "Agreeing to Disagree": Filling Gaps in Deliberately In-
complete Contracts, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 389 (explaining how different gap fillers should apply in
different circumstances and how parties intentionally leave some contract terms incomplete).
211. See Ben-Shahar, supra note 73, at 1830-40, 1844-62 (explaining the principle as a unify-
ing approach and applying it to supplement terms in unclear agreements),
212. See id. at 1844-71 (applying the no-retraction principle to duties to negotiate in good
faith).
213. See id. (further explaining incentives). One may argue that this principle would spark a
race to be the first retractor. This seems unlikely, however, because the retractor would still be
ordered to mediate and may be liable for attorney's fees and costs of involving the courts in the
process.
214. See lain Thain, Almost Contract: (ii) Agreements to Agree, NEW ZEALAND L.J. 162,
163-64 (2005) (explaining New Zealand courts' approaches to agreements to negotiate and lim-
its on enforcement).
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efficiency of resolving disputes. 215 That said, the likely effects of bur-
den allocation are dependent on context. 21 6
In many cases, this may cause a court to find that the parties' ADR
agreement required them to disclose information during an ADR pro-
cess that they would not otherwise have had a duty to reveal. Al-
though courts have become increasingly averse to requiring pre-
contract duties of disclosure in arm's-length transactions, they have
indicated a willingness to find disclosure duties where parties share a
special relationship or have unequal access to information. 217 This is
especially true where a party casually acquired the relevant informa-
tion or has misrepresented the information in some way.21 8 Disclo-
sure duties are appropriate in ADR because parties to these
agreements are not contracting strangers, and they have arguably
formed quasi-fiduciary relationships by the time disputes develop and
they must perform their ADR duties.219 Furthermore, performance
of ADR agreements should mean parties may not disingenuously neg-
lect to disclose information in uneven bargaining contexts.
Indeed, candid and honest communications are essential to fruitful
ADR processes. That is why laws generally protect the confidentiality
of mediation in much the same manner as they protect the confidenti-
ality of other settlement discussions. 220 Although parties need not re-
veal "all their cards" during an ADR process, they should provide
information the mediator reasonably believes to be necessary to facili-
tate fruitful discussions. An ADR process would be futile and
counterproductive if parties were to show up at an ADR session un-
prepared and unwilling to honestly present the facts underlying their
claims. Such passive-aggressive conduct creates an atmosphere of dis-
215. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 18, at 856-60 (explaining how allocation of burdens and
standards of proof can increase efficiency of back-end enforcement of vague contract terms).
216. See id. at 860-64 (emphasizing difficulty of predicting allocation and efficiency of allocat-
ing burdens in practice).
217. Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of
Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1796-97, 1852-68 (2005) (discussing
disclosure duties in common law of contracts and reporting findings from an empirical study of
cases reported from 1789 to 2002).
218. Id. at 1852-68 (reporting findings from study, but not looking specifically at whether
courts find disclosure duties in performing contracts to participate in ADR).
219. See Dobbins, supra note 172, at 240-41 (explaining importance of context in defining the
implied duty of good faith, and acknowledging legitimate application of such duty where there is
disparate bargaining power or "sufficient impact on the community," despite significant criti-
cisms of the duty).
220. See UNIF. MEDIATION AcT, Prefatory Note (2001), reprinted in 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 165,
165-78; see also infra notes 223-235 and accompanying text (discussing confidentiality in
mediation).
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trust and leads other parties to assume defensive postures that prevent
settlement discussions from moving forward.
Of course, any good-faith standard is driven by context and subject
to reasonable disagreement. Good faith should require more with re-
spect to performance of ADR agreements than it does in pre-contrac-
tual negotiations.221 Parties to an ADR agreement have committed
themselves to an essential term-the promise to pursue the stated
ADR process-and courts should use standards of good faith to fill
gaps in that process.222 Furthermore, courts should base such stan-
dards on parties' reasonable expectations, giving greater weight to the
likely expectations of the retracting party in order to promote volun-
tary compliance with an ADR agreement.
V. TACKLING DIFFICULTIES OF DETERMINING BREACH AND
CRAFTING REMEDIES
Once a court finds a valid ADR agreement, the court must consider
how it should enforce that agreement. Proof and remedy issues
should not preclude courts from finding breach of an ADR agree-
ment. Instead, courts should use available tools to provide remedies
for breach, and enforce parties' commitments to engage in ADR in
order to foster contract compliance and cooperative dispute resolu-
tion. Although this proposal may seem simplistic to some, the reality
is that many courts have not followed this approach due to difficulties
of assessing breach claims and crafting middle-ground remedies for
enforcing ADR duties. This Article therefore explores how courts
may overcome evidentiary hurdles to determine whether parties have
breached ADR duties and what remedies courts should apply to ad-
dress a party's breach. Moreover, the Article hopes to spark further
exploration of when and how courts should tackle ADR enforcement
tasks.
221. See Barnes & Robinson Co. v. OneSource Facility Servs., Inc., No. M2004-01003-COA-
R3-CV, 2006 WL 163218, at *3-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2006) (finding no enforceable duty to
negotiate in good faith in the case at issue, but citing other courts' enforcement of such prelimi-
nary agreements indicating commitment on essential terms of the contemplated final contract).
222. See Surface Materials Sales, Inc. v. Surface Prot. Indus. Int'l, 368 F. Supp. 2d 836, 840-42
(N.D. Ohio 2005) (finding action for breach of contract to negotiate appropriate where "unes-
sential term[s] left to future agreement cannot be determined judicially and would otherwise be
left unperformed").
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A. Overcoming Evidentiary Hurdles to Prove Breach of
ADR Duties
Even when courts can determine what conduct constitutes breach of
an ADR agreement, it is difficult for parties to prove breach in court
due to confidentiality agreements and evidentiary or privilege rules
that may preclude courts from considering mediator testimony or
other evidence pertaining to negotiations in an ADR process.22 3 Par-
ties to ADR processes often sign confidentiality agreements before
they begin a process, never expecting that the other party will act in
bad faith or otherwise breach its ADR duties. Moreover, even when
parties do not expressly contract for confidentiality, statutes or court
rules may prevent parties from later admitting ADR communications
in court to prove another party's breach of the ADR agreement.
Candor and open discussion are necessary in ADR processes to fos-
ter fruitful and honest settlement discussions. This is why nonbinding
ADR processes are more confidential than litigation or binding arbi-
tration.224 Policymakers posit that without confidentiality protections,
parties to nonbinding processes may hold back information due to
fear that disclosure will prejudice them in litigation if the process fails
or provide fuel for coerced and one-sided settlements. 225 Nonethe-
less, commentators and policymakers continue to debate the impact of
evidentiary exclusions on our notions of democratic transparency and
on duties to participate in ADR in good faith.226
The drafters of the UMA sought to create confidentiality rules for
mediation communications that navigate the fine line between pro-
moting candor and preventing the bad-faith failure to participate in
mediation. 227 The UMA therefore prescribes a mediator privilege
223. See FED. R. EVID. 408 (protecting against admission of negotiations aimed toward settle-
ment of the case); Jerry P. Roscoe, What Did I Promise? The Path from Confidentiality to Con-
spiracy, JUST RESOLS. (Am. Bar Ass'n Sec. of Disp. Resol.), Apr. 2005, at 6-7 (explaining the
ambiguous confidentiality rules applicable to mediation discussions and conduct).
224. See, e.g., PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND CONCILIA-
TION IN UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONS 326-31, 353 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining confi-
dentiality rules applicable to conciliation under the international model law, and the absence of
such rules regarding arbitration); see also Princeton Ins. Co. v. Vergano, 883 A.2d 44, 61-67 (Del.
Ch. 2005) (emphasizing role of confidentiality in fostering settlement through mediation, and
finding confidentiality considerations barred testimony of a mediator regarding parties' repre-
sentations during the mediation).
225. See UMA §§ 1-16 (2001), reprinted in 22 N. ILL. UNIV. L. REV. 165, 179-247 (2002)
(stating rules for confidentiality, mediator privileges, and disclosures); Elizabeth Strong, The
Uniform Mediation Act, An Opportunity to Enhance Confidentiality in Business Mediation, 7
ADR CURRENTS, June-Aug. 2002, at 5, 6 (discussing confidentiality focus of UMA).
226. See Izumi & La Rue, supra note 90, at 71-76.
227. See Nancy F. Lesser, How Much Confidentiality Does the UMA Provide?, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 11, 2005, at S2 (highlighting the confidentiality rules suggested by the UMA, but noting
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protecting the mediator from being compelled to disclose written, oral,
and nonverbal statements made during the mediation or made for the
purpose of conducting the mediation. 228 The UMA does not, how-
ever, prevent the parties from disclosing mediation communications.
Instead, it leaves the participants to agree to confidentiality rules
before they engage in mediation.229 Furthermore, the UMA does not
preclude disclosure of information that is discovered outside of the
mediation process. 230 In addition, parties may pierce a mediator's
privilege to prove professional misconduct or in other situations
where the need for obtaining evidence substantially outweighs the in-
terest in confidentiality. 231
The Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, jointly
proposed by the ABA and AAA, go a step further by requiring
mediators to foster "honesty and candor" among participants and to
maintain the confidentiality of "all information" obtained in the medi-
ation or protected under an agreement of the parties. 232 Similarly, the
AAA Mediation Procedures protect confidentiality of the communi-
cations made during the mediation process.233 These procedures gen-
erally do not, however, bar the disclosure of underlying information
simply because it was at issue in a mediation.2 34 Furthermore, some
state statutes and mediation rules further limit the enforcement and
application of confidentiality protections to allow disclosure where
necessary in light of public policy and other social goals.235
Confidentiality norms and rules generally focus on protecting com-
munications made during ADR processes, where protection will pro-
limitations of UMA's confidentiality protections). As of Lesser's article, only four states had
adopted the UMA, but many others were considering the Act's adoption. Id.
228. Id.
229. UMA §§ 4-8, reprinted in 22 N. ILL. L. REV. 165, 197-229 (2002); see also Lesser, supra
note 227, at 82-84 (stressing that the onus is on parties to draft confidentiality agreements).
230. See UMA § 4, reprinted in 22 N. ILL. L. REV. 165, 197-205 (2002) (providing a privilege
against admissibility of mediation communications but stating that this privilege does not protect
evidence or information discovered outside of the mediation).
231. See UMA §§ 5-6, reprinted in 22 N. ILL. L. REV. 165, 206-23 (2002) (setting forth preclu-
sions and exceptions to privilege).
232. MEDIATOR STANDARDS, supra note 144, Standard V (allowing a mediator to report
"whether the parties appeared at a scheduled mediation and whether or not the parties reached
a resolution").
233. AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCE-
DURES (July 2003) (requiring confidentiality with respect to mediation disclosures).
234. Doe 1 v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 248, 251-52 (Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that
California law precluded disclosure of materials the Archbishop prepared for mediation, but did
not bar the Church from revealing the underlying information contained in the materials).
235. See Ronald J. Hedges, Mediation Developments & Trends, SK042 ALI-ABA 1485,
1521-31 (2005) (citing various state statutes and court rules limiting enforcement or effect of
confidentiality agreements in litigation and settlement processes).
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mote candid participation in an ADR process. They are not meant to
provide means for parties to pervert ADR processes. For this reason,
these rules generally leave escape hatches that allow for disclosure of
ADR communications where disclosure is necessary to prove another
party's breach of an ADR agreement. Indeed, it would thwart justice
to allow parties to use policy-based confidentiality rules to hide their
failures to pursue ADR in good faith.
Accordingly, courts and policymakers should clarify when parties
may disclose ADR communications where it is necessary to prove a
breach of the duty to participate in an ADR process. Parties should
be permitted to use such safety hatches, however, only when they are
unable to get the necessary proof elsewhere. Every attempt should be
made to protect the confidentiality of ADR communications so that
the integrity and efficacy of ADR processes are preserved. These hur-
dles, however, should not prevent courts from gathering the necessary
evidence to determine whether a party has breached an ADR
agreement.
B. Choosing and Using Judicial Enforcement Tools
Once a court decides that a party has breached an ADR agreement,
the court should openly confront the practical and theoretical difficul-
ties of providing a remedy for the breach. This is not an easy task. It
is generally difficult for a court to calculate damages due to "lost op-
portunity" or reliance damages due to another's failure to properly
engage in ADR. In addition, courts face hurdles in seeking to craft
specific enforcement or injunctive remedies that may effectively force
parties to settle. These difficulties, however, are not insurmountable,
and courts have other remedial tools-such as sanctions-that may be
appropriate in some cases.
1. Damages
Compensatory damages are the preferred remedy for breach of
contract because damages generally compensate parties for losses,
promote contract compliance and certainty in economic transactions,
and require little judicial supervision or administration. 236 Contract
law favors the expectation measure of damages over restitution or re-
liance measures because the expectation measure seeks to place par-
ties in positions they would have attained if the contract had been
236. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS 4-6 (4th ed. 2001) (explaining the expectation damages rule as "easily the most impor-
tant single idea in the whole contracts field").
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performed. 237 It is generally difficult for a court to use these measures
to enforce ADR agreements, however, because a court cannot base
damages on a speculative settlement that the parties may or may not
have reached, and parties' reliance or restitution damages may also be
speculative or nominal.238 Courts may nonetheless use these mea-
sures, as well as sanctions or liquidated damages, to provide proper
relief in some cases.
a. Expectation Damages
Expectation damages seek to provide contracting parties with the
benefit of their bargain.239 The benefit of the bargain under an ADR
agreement generally is the opportunity to pursue the ADR process
the agreement prescribes. The benefit is not certain settlement or as-
surance that the process would have saved the parties from litigation
costs. The parties cannot even claim that their ADR bargain would
have facilitated efficient exchange of information. Instead, the parties
may merely claim that they lost the benefit of the opportunity to par-
ticipate in ADR.
This leaves courts with little to use in attempting to measure expec-
tation damages for breach of an ADR agreement. How does a court
place an economic value on the lost opportunity to engage in ADR?
Theoretically, there may be a way to determine a number based on
the probability of settlement, a likely settlement amount, the esti-
mated savings from avoiding litigation, and so forth. The problem is
that these are all speculative valuations. Such murky measures of
damages generally defy contract rules requiring that claimants prove
damages with reasonable certainty.240
b. Reliance and Restitution Damages
In contrast to the expectation measure's forward focus, reliance and
restitution measures look backward to pre-contract conditions. Reli-
ance damages compensate parties for losses suffered in reliance on the
breached contract, while restitution damages seek to disgorge breach-
ing parties of benefits unfairly retained, or to otherwise place the par-
ties where they would have been if there had been no contract.241
237. 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1002 (1964).
238. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 12.8 (describing reliance damages and commenting
that "the injured party cannot recover damages for loss beyond the amount proved with reason-
able certainty"); id. § 12.19 (describing restitution).
239. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 236, at 4-6.
240. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 12.8.
241. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 236, at 200-11 (explaining the reliance and restitution
measures).
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Although expectation damages have prevailed as the classical mea-
sure for compensating loss, reliance and restitution measures have
gained acceptance for their ability to provide remedies where expecta-
tion damages are speculative or inappropriate. 242 The reliance mea-
sure seeks to provide "justice" by allowing parties to recoup what they
lost in reasonable reliance on a breached promise.243 Restitution
damages, on the other hand, seek to compensate parties for any bene-
fit they conferred on the breaching parties.244
Courts may use reliance or restitution damages to remedy breach of
uncompleted contracts because these measures are generally easier to
determine than expectation damages in such cases.2 45 For example, a
court may order a party who fails to comply with an ADR agreement
to compensate the harmed party for any attorney's fees and costs that
party wasted in preparing for the thwarted ADR process. The court
may also reimburse the injured party for the expense of having to
bring an action to enforce the retracting party's breach of an ADR
promise.
Such damages may not be appropriate, however, where they are so
nominal that they will not adequately remedy the breach or will frus-
trate the public policy encouraging parties to at least "come to the
table" and participate in ADR.246 If a party's liability for breach of an
ADR agreement does not even dent its wallet, then the remedy serves
no real purpose and wastes everyone's time and resources. In such
cases, reliance or restitution damages may not adequately or effi-
ciently compensate a party for the lost opportunity to participate in
ADR.
Nonetheless, in some cases, restitution or reliance damages provide
tools the courts may use to compensate an injured party for lost op-
portunity to comply with an ADR agreement.247 The Copeland court
242. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981) (noting different measures of
damages, including reliance and restitution); Copeland v. Baskin Robbins, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875,
880 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding reliance, instead of expectation, damages would be appropriate for
breach of an agreement to negotiate).
243. Knapp, supra note 10, at 1264-74 (discussing justice concerns underlying promissory es-
toppel and protection of the reliance interest).
244. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 119, § 12.8.
245. Knapp, supra note 10, at 1198-1200 (explaining modern development of reliance
protection).
246. See Office Env'ts, Inc. v. Lake States Ins. Co., 833 N.E.2d 489, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(finding that limiting sanctions for failure to participate in court-ordered mediation to costs or
attorney's fees would "frustrate the [court's] goal" of encouraging ADR).
247. See Copeland, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 880-84 (struggling with unclear caselaw regarding the
breach of a contract to negotiate, but concluding that if one can prove such breach, then the
appropriate damages remedy must be based on the injured party's reliance on the agreement to
negotiate).
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emphasized this point in finding that "the appropriate remedy for
breach of a contract to negotiate is not damages for the injured party's
lost expectations under the prospective contract but damages caused
by the injured party's reliance on the agreement to negotiate. 2 48 This
also comports with contract law condoning compensatory damages
but denouncing punitive remedies. Moreover, assessing restitution or
reliance damages at least signals to the parties that their ADR agree-
ments are not entirely meaningless. This, in turn, may promote the
use of and compliance with ADR agreements.
c. Nominal Damages
Courts may resort to ordering nominal damages where a plaintiff
has proven breach but is unable to prove the amount of loss with rea-
sonable certainty. 249 Nominal damages are not compensatory; they
are small sums that courts assess based on custom or court rule in the
relevant jurisdiction-generally without regard to actual harm caused
by the breach. 250
In some jurisdictions, courts couple nominal damages with a judg-
ment for the costs of the action.251 Some question courts' use of nomi-
nal damages to shift costs, while others reject nominal damages
awards to parties who cannot prove any loss. In addition, many agree
that courts should exercise caution in ordering nominal damages, let
alone measuring them by court costs. 252
With respect to enforcing ADR agreements, a court may order the
breaching party to pay nominal damages where the injured party can-
not prove actual losses due to the breach. Such minimal liability may
not provide sufficient incentive to participate in ADR. Nonetheless,
an award of nominal damages and costs would signal to the breaching
party, and to other contractors, that their ADR promises are not
empty. Moreover, nominal damages may be the only appropriate
remedy where the injured parties' expectation, reliance, or restitution
interests are impossible to measure, and it would be improper for the
court to order the parties' participation in the ADR process.
d. Liquidated Damages
A monetary remedy that should not go unmentioned is liquidated
damages. Contracting parties may agree that the breaching party
248. Id. at 884.
249. 5 CORBIN, supra note 237, § 1001.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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must pay the other party a specific sum or amount based on objec-
tively determined factors. They do so in order to increase the cer-
tainty of compliance and enforcement, and to decrease the costs of
requiring a court to calculate damages based on expectation, reliance,
or restitution measures. Liquidated-damages provisions also may de-
crease uncertainty of vague contract terms by constraining how a
court will enforce these terms.25 3 Furthermore, courts are generally
eager to enforce these provisions where damages are difficult to deter-
mine and the liquidated amount under the contract appears to have
been a reasonable estimate of likely damages at the time of
contracting.
Despite the potential efficiency benefits of liquidated-damages pro-
visions, however, it appears that parties have not employed them to
reduce the uncertainty of enforcing their ADR agreements. Searches
of caselaw reveal little to no discussion of liquidated damages
awarded for breach of an ADR agreement.2 54 This is likely because
parties rarely include them in their ADR agreements, and simply
comply with contracts that do contain them.
Parties generally incorporate ADR agreements in their contracts at
a time when they are focused on other key components of their con-
tracts and not expecting disputes to develop. These parties usually
expect ADR provisions to fend off litigation, not to spark legal fights
about participation in a process. For example, parties negotiating a
sales contract are likely to focus their bargaining resources on setting
price and delivery terms favorable to their needs, and are unlikely to
invest resources negotiating the specifics of an ADR clause. Instead,
parties to ADR provisions expect that these provisions will prevent
litigation and minimize any dispute resolution costs. They likely view
consideration of liquidated damages a waste of time and resources.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that many parties do not include
such liquidated-damages provisions in their ADR agreements. With
respect to pre-dispute agreements, it is often inefficient for parties to
invest front-end transaction resources negotiating these provisions.
Furthermore, it is generally impractical to expect parties to add post-
253. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 18, at 835-46, 855-56, 878-79 (discussing efficiency of
vague terms, and explaining how liquidated damages provisions may constrain a court's "choice
of proxies" in enforcing such terms).
254. March 15, 2006 searches on Westlaw of all federal and state cases using "(contract /3
negot!) /30 (liquid! w/3 damag!)" and "(contract /3 mediat!) and (liquid! w/3 damag!)" yielded
no cases involving enforcement of liquidated damages provisions in ADR agreements. Similar
searches on Lexis on the same date located only one case tangentially involving such enforce-
ment, International CableTel Inc. v. Le Groupe Videotron Ltee, 978 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1997),
which is discussed below.
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dispute liquidated-damages provisions to their ADR agreements
before initiating ADR. Although such provisions may ease a court's
burden in measuring losses due to breach of vague ADR terms, dis-
puting parties generally focus on resolving all of their claims, not
merely setting damages for peripheral ADR provisions. Therefore,
any so-called liquidated-damages provision would in fact be a settle-
ment agreement.
That is not to say parties should never link the breach of an ADR
clause with a liquidated-damages provision. Some parties may be wise
to include such a provision to clarify enforcement of an ADR clause
and signal their commitment to their chosen ADR process. For exam-
ple, parties negotiating a deal involving intellectual property may use
a liquidated-damages provision to solidify their commitment to re-
solve their disputes in a confidential ADR process to better assure
that their proprietary information will avoid trial's public eye. Simi-
larly, parties to an ongoing supply contract for a construction project
may allocate liquidated damages for breach of an ADR clause as a
means for ensuring that parties will follow through with an ADR pro-
cess instead of disrupting performance with litigation that would
thwart timely completion of a project and subject contractors to addi-
tional liability. In addition, parties may want to include a liquidated-
damages provision in an ADR agreement merely because they dis-
trust the others' commitment to an ADR process.
At the same time, courts should broaden their view of liquidated-
damages provisions in underlying contracts to consider how a provi-
sion may apply to remedy a breach of an ADR clause in the contract.
A court may construe a general liquidated-damages provision linked
to breach of "any claims" to require a party to pay that sum not only
for breach of the underlying contract, but also for breach of the ADR
clause.
In International CableTel Inc. v. LeGroupe Videotron Ltee,2 55 for
example, the court noted that a provision specifying a $10,000,000
payment as damages for settling "any claims" would have barred all
claims by CableTel against the defendant, including CableTel's claims
that the defendant fraudulently failed to negotiate exclusively with
CableTel as their contract required.2 5 6 CableTel argued that its fraud
claim was collateral to the contract and therefore it could recover ex-
tracontractual tort damages against the defendants. The court dis-
agreed, however, emphasizing that liquidated-damages provisions
255. 978 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
256. Id. at 486-90.
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should be read broadly to cover all claims to enhance "the predictabil-
ity that is essential to contracting. '2 57
Liquidated damages provisions therefore may create an avenue for
more predictable and efficient enforcement of ADR agreements.
Courts should generally enforce these provisions, provided they do
not state unreasonable amounts or otherwise appear to penalize
breach. This is appropriate because ADR agreements present the sort
of indeterminate damages problems that liquidated-damages provi-
sions seek to address. Nonetheless, it may not always be worthwhile
or efficient for parties to negotiate these provisions in their contracts,
and parties to ADR agreements may believe that no amount of dam-
ages would be adequate because they adamantly want the opportunity
to seek settlement through an ADR process.
2. Specific Enforcement and Injunctive Remedies
The tools that best effectuate the intent of the parties to an ADR
agreement will often be equitable remedies such as specific perform-
ance and injunctive relief. Specific performance is an appropriate
remedy for a breach of contract where damages would not adequately
compensate loss, the court will not be overburdened with enforcing its
order, and such relief is otherwise appropriate in light of the facts of
the particular case.258 Stated more simply, courts should apply this
remedy when the benefits of ordering specific relief outweigh the det-
riments that would result from the order.259 Such relief is appropriate
when it will promote justice, and courts need not reserve it for rare
cases.
260
Courts have traditionally limited the use of specific performance to
cases involving real estate or other unique property. 261 They based
this limit on the traditional "inadequacy of damages" or "irreparable
harm" requirement for justifying use of these equitable remedies. 262
257. Id. at 489-90.
258. See 5A CORBIN, supra note 118, §§ 1139, 1171 (discussing courts' application of specific
performance remedies in light of adequacy of damages and difficulty of enforcement).
259. Id. § 1136 (questioning any limitation on equitable remedies to cases where damages
would be inadequate in light of the unification of law and equity courts, and courts' duty to grant
relief that will best compensate an injured party).
260. Id.
261. See id. §§ 1142-43 (stating the traditional rule); see also JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH
M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CorRACrS § 16.1-16.2 (3d ed. 1998) (explaining courts' prospecific
enforcement attitude in ordering remedies for breach of contracts for sale of real property, and
sale of unique goods under the UCC).
262. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.1(1) (2d ed. 1993); JAMES M. FISHER, UNDER-
STANDING REMEDIES 149 (2001). But see Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury
Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1990) (arguing that the irreparable injury rule should not, and
20061
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Nonetheless, modern courts have eased this traditional reluctance to
order specific remedies. 263 They recognize that the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts and the UCC support a more liberal application of
equitable remedies. 264 Furthermore, courts have become more open
to ordering parties to negotiate or mediate in good faith in light of
public policy supporting private dispute resolution. 265 This is espe-
cially true where it appears negotiation or mediation would produce a
settlement or benefit long-term or interdependent relations.266
Accordingly, courts may use specific enforcement to order partici-
pation in a private resolution process when the benefits of participa-
tion outweigh the detriment caused by ordering participation in the
process.267 Courts may also use more passive injunctive remedies to
prevent parties from litigating claims in defiance of their ADR agree-
ments. For example, a court may stay or dismiss litigation until the
parties comply with an ADR process that the parties' agreement re-
quires as an express or implied condition precedent to seeking judicial
does not, exist in any substantial way). Some courts have continued to apply the "irreparable
harm" limit despite the merger of law and equity courts. DOBBS, supra note 262, at 51 (also
discussing limits on equitable powers). See generally JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (4th ed. 1918)
(discussing continued "Equity Jurisprudence" after the merger of law and equity).
263. See Gene R. Sheve, The Premature Burial of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 70 TEx. L. REV.
1063 (1992) (book review) (noting expansion of specific performance, but finding that the irrepa-
rable harm rule survives); see also Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir. 1985)
(emphasizing "irreparable harm" as "the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction").
264. See Harold Greenberg, Specific Performance Under Section 2-716 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: "A More Liberal Attitude" in the "Grand Style," 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 321,344-45
(1982) (discussing more liberal application of equitable remedies); Alan Schwartz, The Case for
Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 275-79 (1979) (proposing that "the compensation goal
implies that specific performance should be routinely available").
265. See Fluor Enters., Inc. v. Solutia Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 648, 650-51 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (com-
pelling mediation as proscribed in the parties' contract); AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F.
Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding it had power to order participation in nonbinding arbitra-
tion under both the FAA and the court's equitable power); Marshall v. U.S. Home Corp., No.
20573, 2002 WL 274457, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2002) (staying proceeding to enforce
mediation and arbitration provisions); see also Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745,
750 n.10 (E.D. Va. 2001) (stating the AMF court relied on its "inherent equitable powers" to stay
litigation); PERILLO, supra note 261, § 2.8(b) (noting modern courts' willingness to enforce a
contractual duty to negotiate in good faith).
266. See Katz, supra note 68, at 575-77, 584-95 (advocating specific enforcement of dispute
resolution agreements where participation in the process may benefit the parties' relationship);
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neo-
classical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 879, 891-901 (1978) (discussing
suitability of dispute resolution mechanisms to ongoing relations); Sid L. Moller, Birth of Con-
tract: Arbitration in the Non-Union Workplace, 50 S.C. L. REV. 183, 204-11 (1998) (proposing
that private dispute resolution processes are suited to employment because it is a relational and
interdependent activity).
267. See Schmitz, supra note 8, at 63-66.
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relief.2 68 A court also may stay litigation pending parties' compliance
with an ADR agreement if expressly allowed by statute or by analogy
to a statutory or other policy-based requirement to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies before filing suit.269
Courts may also stay litigation to foster a related ADR process
based on the court's power to "control the disposition of the causes on
its docket. T270 Courts may justify their use of this power by analogiz-
ing to courts' use of this power to stay litigation related to but not
covered by an arbitration agreement governed by the FAA. 271
Courts have stayed litigation, for example, where the arbitration
and court proceedings involve common issues, those issues will be fi-
nally determined in the arbitration, and staying litigation pending the
process will not cause undue hardship to the parties.272 This was the
case in Cosmotek Mumessillik Ve Ticaret Ltd. Sirkketi v. Cosmotek
U.S.A., Inc.2 73 In that case, the court used its inherent power to stay a
foreign distributor's action against the manufacturer pending arbitra-
tion of the distributor's related disputes under its contract with a
United States distributor, even though the manufacturer was not
bound by the contract containing the arbitration clause. The stay was
intended to encourage the disputants to join in cooperative resolution
of the product defect claims. 274
268. See Kemiron Atl., Inc. v. Aguakem Int'l, Inc., 290 F.3d 1287, 1291 (1lth Cir. 2002) (hold-
ing mediation was a condition precedent to arbitration under the parties' agreement, and there-
fore the arbitration provision had not been activated and the FAA did not apply); Bill Call Ford,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 830 F. Supp. 1045, 1053 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (dismissing franchisee's claim
for failure to seek mediation as a condition precedent to litigating under the parties' agreement);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 224 (1981) ("A condition is an event, not certain to
occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a con-
tract becomes due."); 3A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTACts § 628 (1960) (dis-
cussing conditions precedent); Schmitz, supra note 8, at 66-71 (discussing use of exhaustion and
condition analysis).
269. See Penny Brooker & Anthony Layers, Mediation Outcomes: Lawyers' Experience with
Commercial and Construction Mediation in the United Kingdom, 5 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 161,
162-76 (2005) (discussing the United Kingdom's Civil Procedure Rule mandating that courts
actively manage their caseloads and encourage ADR, and allowing them to use that power to
stay litigation while parties pursue ADR processes); see also Schmitz, supra note 8, at 66-71
(discussing enforcement by analogy to statutes requiring disputants to pursue an administrative
or other resolution process prior to filing litigation on their claims).
270. Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
271. See Nederlandse Erts-Tankersmaatschappij, N.V. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 339 F.2d 440, 441
(2d Cir. 1964) (indicating a stay may be appropriate where issues involved are subject to
arbitration).
272. Am. Shipping Line v. Massan Shipping Indus., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 499, 502 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); see also Sierra Rutile, Ltd. v. Katz, 937 F.2d 743, 750 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating same rules).
273. 942 F. Supp. 757, 760-61 (D. Conn. 1996).
274. Id. The court seemed to question the prudence of the distributor's opposition to the stay,
and advocated "faster resolution" through the arbitration "if counsel are conscientious." Id.
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In addition, courts often have power to order parties to engage in
ADR processes prescribed by statutes or judicial rules, even when the
parties have not signed an ADR agreement.275 Courts disagree, how-
ever, on whether they have inherent power to order parties to engage
in ADR.276 Some courts conclude that they may use their inherent
power to manage their dockets as justification for ordering nonbind-
ing ADR, while others hold that their inherent powers do not extend
this far.277 Meanwhile, some commentators propose that legislatures
should clarify judicial rules to grant courts such power in order to ef-
fectively manage judicial affairs and litigant conduct.2 78
Specific performance and injunctive relief may not always be
equally appropriate. 279 In some cases, injunctive relief may be more
appropriate than specific performance because it is considered less co-
ercive and may require less judicial oversight.28 0  Injunctions often
strike a better balance between the important interests in efficiency,
freedom of contract, and fairness.281 Nonetheless, bad faith may jus-
tify strict specific performance and judicial supervision of that per-
formance in some cases. This could promote commercial morality and
efficiency by causing the parties to negotiate whatever result would
create the optimal distribution of resources for all involved. 282
However, the court sought to insure against prejudice to the distributor by requiring periodic
updates regarding the arbitration to verify "that the early hearing and decision which are the
hallmark of arbitration are in fact afforded to [the distributorship]." Id. Furthermore, the dis-
tributor remained free to seek to vacate the stay if a risk of prejudice from delay became appar-
ent. Id.
275. Amy M. Pugh & Richard A. Bales, The Inherent Power of the Federal Courts to Compel
Participation in Nonbinding Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 42 Duo. L. REV. 1, 14
(2003) (discussing various rules and statutes allowing courts to order ADR).
276. Id. at 14-19 (discussing split of authority on this issue); see also Sierra, 937 F.2d at 750
(finding that a court has inherent power to stay an action related to a pending arbitration "in
which issues involved in the case may be determined," but declining to stay claims that would
not be affected by the arbitration (quoting Nederlandse, 339 F.2d at 440)).
277. See Pugh & Bales, supra note 275, at 14-19 (explaining courts' positions).
278. Id. at 23-26.
279. See Beverly Glen Music, Inc. v. Warner Comm'cs, Inc., 224 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Ct. App.
1986) (noting that courts may order injunctive relief in cases where it would be improper for the
court to order specific performance, such as personal services contracts); EDWARD YORIO, CON-
TRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCmIONS § 1.2.2 (1989) (noting distinc-
tions between specific performance and injunctions).
280. See Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1365, 1375-76 (1982) (providing hypothetical case in which injunctive relief may be more
appropriate than the more coercive specific enforcement remedy); see also Richards v. Foulk,
345 So. 2d 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (staying litigation pending statutorily required
mediation).
281. Yorio, supra note 280, at 1376-77, 1397-1404.
282. See id. at 1407-11 (noting how "morality and efficiency do not necessarily part company"
in most cases involving a deliberate breach); see also Ben-Shahar, supra note 73, at 1839,
1851-52 (proposing a no-retraction regime precluding parties from retracting freely from their
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3. Sanctions and Evidentiary Exclusions
Some courts have imposed sanctions on parties who defy their du-
ties to participate in ADR. Sanctions come in different forms. Courts
may order parties to pay set penalties, attorney's fees, and other costs
of wasted preparations for an ADR process. They also may strike
pleadings, exclude evidence, or even dismiss a case, due to a party's
failure to participate in ADR in good faith.283
Courts usually have the power to order sanctions under legislative
directives or court rules, and may go so far as to dismiss with prejudice
where there is clear evidence of bad faith.284 They will not resort to
dismissal, however, where other enforcement devices are available.2 85
Courts are more likely to stay litigation or order the costs or attor-
ney's fees as sanctions.28 6 They also may fashion remedies suited to
address a party's particular bad-faith conduct. In one case, for exam-
ple, the court found that it was appropriate for the trial court to bar
evidence a party failed to properly present in a court-ordered
mediation.287
Courts are also reluctant to punish parties with sanctions where the
parties' attorneys caused the failure to participate in an ADR process.
In Wetherholt v. Mercado Mexico Cafe,288 for example, the court
found that a client should not suffer for the sins of its attorney. 289 The
court therefore found it improper to dismiss the case or strike plead-
ings because the plaintiff's first attorney failed to answer discovery
requests, and did not attend or even notify the plaintiff of a court-
representations and defending against the argument that this is inefficient by explaining that
parties are not bound to inefficient contracts because they remain free to negotiate a more effi-
cient alternative).
283. See Office Env'ts, Inc. v. Lake States Ins. Co., 833 N.E.2d 489, 490-93 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005) (affirming dismissal of case for failure to mediate pursuant to court order).
284. Id. at 493-96.
285. See Brock v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 678 (Ct. App. 1992) (finding a court
should not dismiss a plaintiff's claim for failure to comply with a contractual duty to arbitrate
where the court could use a statute or equitable powers to order the parties to participate in the
arbitration and criticizing Boutwell v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 254 Cal. Rptr. 173 (Ct. App.
1988) which found that dismissal was appropriate where the plaintiff failed to pursue contractual
arbitration for five years).
286. See Harlan v. Dep't of Transp., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 913-15 (Ct. App. 2005) (affirming
award of fees paid to attorney to prepare for negotiations as an appropriate remedy for breach
of an agreement to negotiate in good faith); Luxenberg v. Marshall, 985 S.W.2d 136, 141-42
(Tex. App. 1992) (finding sanctions appropriate against a party who failed to participate in court-
ordered mediation).
287. See Fisher v. Herrera, 367 So. 2d 204, 206-07 (Fla. 1978).
288. 844 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App. 1992).
289. Id. at 808.
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ordered mediation or the subsequent hearing to determine
sanctions. 290
VI. CONCLUSION
Why is it so difficult to enforce what public policy deems so
"good"? Pro-ADR rhetoric is in vogue, but few courts are willing to
put rhetoric into action by effectively enforcing agreements to partici-
pate in ADR. This is understandable in light of the difficulties of de-
fining good-faith participation in ADR, determining breach of ADR
duties, and devising proper remedies for such breach. There is a fine
line between promoting ADR and forcing settlement.
Courts should nonetheless confront these difficulties instead of hid-
ing behind yes-contract/no-contract conclusions. ADR agreements
have become an important category of contracts to bargain that de-
serves proper analysis and enforcement. It is time for courts to care-
fully and separately consider (1) whether there is a valid ADR
agreement and (2) how to enforce that agreement using duties of good
faith and creative contract remedies. Courts should ease formalist
fear of flexible and contextual contract enforcement in order to tackle
these tasks. Although this may seem contrary to efficiency-focused
contract law, such enforcement of ADR agreements is important to
preserve their efficacy and integrity.
290. Id.
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